in-toto is a CNCF graduated project that ensures the integrity of software supply chains from initiation to end-user installation. It creates a verifiable record of the entire software development lifecycle by generating cryptographically signed attestations (called "link metadata") at each step, proving what happened, who performed it, and what artifacts were produced. For container environments, in-toto verifies that images deployed to Kubernetes followed approved build processes and have not been tampered with.
The layout is the central policy document that defines:
from in_toto.models.layout import Layout, Step, Inspection
from securesystemslib.interface import import_ed25519_privatekey_from_file
# Create the supply chain layout
layout = Layout()
layout.set_relative_expiration(months=3)
# Define the code clone step
step_clone = Step(name="clone")
step_clone.expected_materials = []
step_clone.expected_products = [["CREATE", "src/*"]]
step_clone.pubkeys = [clone_functionary_keyid]
step_clone.expected_command = ["git", "clone"]
step_clone.threshold = 1
# Define the build step
step_build = Step(name="build")
step_build.expected_materials = [["MATCH", "src/*", "WITH", "PRODUCTS", "FROM", "clone"]]
step_build.expected_products = [["CREATE", "image.tar"]]
step_build.pubkeys = [build_functionary_keyid]
step_build.expected_command = ["docker", "build"]
step_build.threshold = 1
# Define the scan step
step_scan = Step(name="scan")
step_scan.expected_materials = [["MATCH", "image.tar", "WITH", "PRODUCTS", "FROM", "build"]]
step_scan.expected_products = [["CREATE", "scan-report.json"]]
step_scan.pubkeys = [scan_functionary_keyid]
step_scan.threshold = 1
layout.steps = [step_clone, step_build, step_scan]
Each step execution generates a link file containing:
At deployment time, the verifier checks:
# Generate Ed25519 key pairs for each functionary
mkdir -p keys
# Project owner key (signs the layout)
in-toto-keygen --type ed25519 keys/owner
# CI builder key
in-toto-keygen --type ed25519 keys/builder
# Security scanner key
in-toto-keygen --type ed25519 keys/scanner
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Generate in-toto supply chain layout for container builds."""
from in_toto.models.layout import Layout, Step, Inspection
from in_toto.models.metadata import Envelope
from securesystemslib.signer import CryptoSigner
from securesystemslib.interface import import_ed25519_publickey_from_file
def create_container_build_layout():
layout = Layout()
layout.set_relative_expiration(months=6)
# Load functionary public keys
builder_key = import_ed25519_publickey_from_file("keys/builder.pub")
scanner_key = import_ed25519_publickey_from_file("keys/scanner.pub")
layout.keys = {
builder_key["keyid"]: builder_key,
scanner_key["keyid"]: scanner_key,
}
# Step 1: Source code checkout
checkout = Step(name="checkout")
checkout.expected_materials = []
checkout.expected_products = [
["CREATE", "Dockerfile"],
["CREATE", "src/*"],
["CREATE", "requirements.txt"],
]
checkout.pubkeys = [builder_key["keyid"]]
checkout.threshold = 1
# Step 2: Build container image
build = Step(name="build")
build.expected_materials = [
["MATCH", "Dockerfile", "WITH", "PRODUCTS", "FROM", "checkout"],
["MATCH", "src/*", "WITH", "PRODUCTS", "FROM", "checkout"],
]
build.expected_products = [["CREATE", "image-digest.txt"]]
build.pubkeys = [builder_key["keyid"]]
build.threshold = 1
# Step 3: Security scan
scan = Step(name="scan")
scan.expected_materials = [
["MATCH", "image-digest.txt", "WITH", "PRODUCTS", "FROM", "build"]
]
scan.expected_products = [
["CREATE", "vulnerability-report.json"],
["CREATE", "sbom.json"],
]
scan.pubkeys = [scanner_key["keyid"]]
scan.threshold = 1
# Inspection: Verify no critical vulnerabilities
inspect_vulns = Inspection(name="verify-no-critical-vulns")
inspect_vulns.expected_materials = [
["MATCH", "vulnerability-report.json", "WITH", "PRODUCTS", "FROM", "scan"]
]
inspect_vulns.run = [
"python", "-c",
"import json,sys; r=json.load(open('vulnerability-report.json')); "
"sys.exit(1) if any(v['severity']=='CRITICAL' for v in r.get('vulnerabilities',[])) else sys.exit(0)"
]
layout.steps = [checkout, build, scan]
layout.inspect = [inspect_vulns]
return layout
if __name__ == "__main__":
layout = create_container_build_layout()
# Sign with owner key and save
owner_signer = CryptoSigner.from_priv_key_uri("file:keys/owner")
envelope = Envelope.from_signable(layout)
envelope.create_signature(owner_signer)
envelope.dump("root.layout")
print("Layout created and signed: root.layout")
# In CI/CD pipeline - record each step
# Step 1: Checkout
in-toto-run --step-name checkout \
--key keys/builder \
--products Dockerfile src/* requirements.txt \
-- git clone https://github.com/org/app.git .
# Step 2: Build
in-toto-run --step-name build \
--key keys/builder \
--materials Dockerfile src/* \
--products image-digest.txt \
-- bash -c "docker build -t app:latest . && docker inspect --format='{{.Id}}' app:latest > image-digest.txt"
# Step 3: Scan
in-toto-run --step-name scan \
--key keys/scanner \
--materials image-digest.txt \
--products vulnerability-report.json sbom.json \
-- bash -c "trivy image --format json app:latest > vulnerability-report.json && syft app:latest -o json > sbom.json"
# Verify the entire supply chain
in-toto-verify --layout root.layout \
--layout-key keys/owner.pub \
--link-dir ./link-metadata/
# If verification passes, proceed with deployment
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
kubectl apply -f deployment.yaml
echo "Supply chain verification passed - deploying"
else
echo "SUPPLY CHAIN VERIFICATION FAILED - blocking deployment"
exit 1
fi
Integrate with a policy engine to verify attestations at admission:
apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1
kind: ValidatingWebhookConfiguration
metadata:
name: in-toto-verifier
webhooks:
- name: verify.in-toto.io
rules:
- apiGroups: ["apps"]
resources: ["deployments"]
operations: ["CREATE", "UPDATE"]
clientConfig:
service:
name: in-toto-webhook
namespace: security
path: /verify
failurePolicy: Fail
sideEffects: None
admissionReviewVersions: ["v1"]
in-toto attestations map directly to SLSA (Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts) requirements:
| SLSA Level | in-toto Requirement |
|---|---|
| Level 1 | Build process documented (layout exists) |
| Level 2 | Signed attestations from hosted build service |
| Level 3 | Hardened build platform, non-falsifiable provenance |
| Level 4 | Two-party review, hermetic builds |