Do not use against production environments without explicit authorization and monitoring. RESTler creates and deletes resources aggressively during fuzzing.
# Clone and build RESTler
git clone https://github.com/microsoft/restler-fuzzer.git
cd restler-fuzzer
# Build RESTler
python3 ./build-restler.py --dest_dir /opt/restler
# Verify installation
/opt/restler/restler/Restler --help
# Alternative: Use pre-built release
# Download from https://github.com/microsoft/restler-fuzzer/releases
# Compile the OpenAPI spec into a RESTler fuzzing grammar
/opt/restler/restler/Restler compile \
--api_spec /path/to/openapi.yaml
# Output directory structure:
# Compile/
# grammar.py - Generated fuzzing grammar
# grammar.json - Grammar in JSON format
# dict.json - Custom dictionary for fuzzing values
# engine_settings.json - Engine configuration
# config.json - Compilation config
Custom dictionary for targeted fuzzing (dict.json):
{
"restler_fuzzable_string": [
"fuzzstring",
"' OR '1'='1",
"\" OR \"1\"=\"1",
"<script>alert(1)</script>",
"../../../etc/passwd",
"${7*7}",
"{{7*7}}",
"a]UNION SELECT 1,2,3--",
"\"; cat /etc/passwd; echo \"",
"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
],
"restler_fuzzable_int": [
"0",
"-1",
"999999999",
"2147483647",
"-2147483648"
],
"restler_fuzzable_bool": ["true", "false", "null", "1", "0"],
"restler_fuzzable_datetime": [
"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"0000-00-00T00:00:00Z",
"9999-12-31T23:59:59Z",
"invalid-date"
],
"restler_fuzzable_uuid4": [
"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"aaaaaaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa"
],
"restler_custom_payload": {
"/users/{userId}": ["1", "0", "-1", "admin", "' OR 1=1--"],
"/orders/{orderId}": ["1", "0", "999999999"]
}
}
# authentication_token.py - RESTler authentication module
import requests
import json
import time
class AuthenticationProvider:
def __init__(self):
self.token = None
self.token_expiry = 0
self.auth_url = "https://target-api.example.com/api/v1/auth/login"
self.credentials = {
"email": "fuzzer@test.com",
"password": "FuzzerPass123!"
}
def get_token(self):
"""Get or refresh authentication token."""
current_time = time.time()
if self.token and current_time < self.token_expiry - 60:
return self.token
resp = requests.post(self.auth_url, json=self.credentials)
if resp.status_code == 200:
data = resp.json()
self.token = data["access_token"]
self.token_expiry = current_time + 3600 # Assume 1-hour TTL
return self.token
else:
raise Exception(f"Authentication failed: {resp.status_code}")
def get_auth_header(self):
"""Return the authentication header for RESTler."""
token = self.get_token()
return f"Authorization: Bearer {token}"
# Export the token refresh command for RESTler
auth = AuthenticationProvider()
print(auth.get_auth_header())
Engine settings for authentication (engine_settings.json):
{
"authentication": {
"token": {
"token_refresh_interval": 300,
"token_refresh_cmd": "python3 /path/to/authentication_token.py"
}
},
"max_combinations": 20,
"max_request_execution_time": 30,
"global_producer_timing_delay": 2,
"no_ssl": false,
"host": "target-api.example.com",
"target_port": 443,
"garbage_collection_interval": 300,
"max_sequence_length": 10
}
# Test mode: Quick validation that all endpoints are reachable
/opt/restler/restler/Restler test \
--grammar_file Compile/grammar.py \
--dictionary_file Compile/dict.json \
--settings Compile/engine_settings.json \
--no_ssl \
--target_ip target-api.example.com \
--target_port 443
# Review test results
cat Test/ResponseBuckets/runSummary.json
# Parse test results
import json
with open("Test/ResponseBuckets/runSummary.json") as f:
summary = json.load(f)
print("Test Mode Summary:")
print(f" Total requests: {summary.get('total_requests_sent', {}).get('num_requests', 0)}")
print(f" Successful (2xx): {summary.get('num_fully_valid', 0)}")
print(f" Client errors (4xx): {summary.get('num_invalid', 0)}")
print(f" Server errors (5xx): {summary.get('num_server_error', 0)}")
# Identify uncovered endpoints
covered = summary.get('covered_endpoints', [])
total = summary.get('total_endpoints', [])
uncovered = set(total) - set(covered)
if uncovered:
print(f"\nUncovered endpoints ({len(uncovered)}):")
for ep in uncovered:
print(f" - {ep}")
# Fuzz-lean: One pass through all endpoints with security checkers enabled
/opt/restler/restler/Restler fuzz-lean \
--grammar_file Compile/grammar.py \
--dictionary_file Compile/dict.json \
--settings Compile/engine_settings.json \
--target_ip target-api.example.com \
--target_port 443 \
--time_budget 1 # 1 hour max
# Checkers automatically enabled in fuzz-lean:
# - UseAfterFree: Tests accessing resources after deletion
# - NamespaceRule: Tests accessing resources across namespaces/tenants
# - ResourceHierarchy: Tests child resources with wrong parent IDs
# - LeakageRule: Tests for information disclosure in error responses
# - InvalidDynamicObject: Tests with malformed dynamic object IDs
# Full fuzz mode: Extended fuzzing for comprehensive coverage
/opt/restler/restler/Restler fuzz \
--grammar_file Compile/grammar.py \
--dictionary_file Compile/dict.json \
--settings Compile/engine_settings.json \
--target_ip target-api.example.com \
--target_port 443 \
--time_budget 4 \
--enable_checkers UseAfterFree NamespaceRule ResourceHierarchy LeakageRule InvalidDynamicObject PayloadBody
# Analyze fuzzing results
python3 <<'EOF'
import json
import os
results_dir = "Fuzz/ResponseBuckets"
bugs_dir = "Fuzz/bug_buckets"
# Parse bug buckets
if os.path.exists(bugs_dir):
for bug_file in os.listdir(bugs_dir):
if bug_file.endswith(".txt"):
with open(os.path.join(bugs_dir, bug_file)) as f:
content = f.read()
print(f"\n=== Bug: {bug_file} ===")
print(content[:500])
# Parse response summary
summary_file = os.path.join(results_dir, "runSummary.json")
if os.path.exists(summary_file):
with open(summary_file) as f:
summary = json.load(f)
print(f"\nFuzz Summary:")
print(f" Duration: {summary.get('time_budget_hours', 0)} hours")
print(f" Total requests: {summary.get('total_requests_sent', {}).get('num_requests', 0)}")
print(f" Bugs found: {summary.get('num_bugs', 0)}")
print(f" 500 errors: {summary.get('num_server_error', 0)}")
EOF
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Stateful Fuzzing | API fuzzing that maintains state across requests by using responses from earlier requests as inputs to later ones, enabling testing of multi-step workflows |
| Producer-Consumer Dependencies | RESTler's inference that a value produced by one API call (e.g., a created resource ID) should be consumed by a subsequent call |
| Fuzzing Grammar | Compiled representation of the API specification that defines how to generate valid and invalid requests for each endpoint |
| Checker | RESTler security rule that tests for specific vulnerability patterns like use-after-free, namespace isolation, or information leakage |
| Bug Bucket | RESTler's categorization of discovered bugs by type and endpoint, grouping similar failures for efficient triage |
| Garbage Collection | RESTler's periodic cleanup of resources created during fuzzing to prevent resource exhaustion on the target system |
Context: A fintech company has 12 microservice APIs with OpenAPI specifications. Before a major release, the security team runs RESTler fuzzing against each service in the staging environment to catch bugs.
Approach:
Pitfalls:
## RESTler API Fuzzing Report
**Target**: User Service API (staging.example.com)
**Specification**: OpenAPI 3.0 (42 endpoints)
**Duration**: 4 hours (full fuzz mode)
**Total Requests**: 145,832
### Bug Summary
| Category | Count | Severity |
|----------|-------|----------|
| 500 Internal Server Error | 12 | High |
| Use After Free | 3 | Critical |
| Namespace Rule Violation | 5 | Critical |
| Information Leakage | 8 | Medium |
| Resource Leak | 4 | Low |
### Critical Findings
**1. Use-After-Free: Deleted user token still valid**
- Sequence: POST /users -> DELETE /users/{id} -> GET /users/{id}
- After deleting user, GET with the deleted user's token returns 200
- Impact: Deleted accounts can still access the API
**2. Namespace Violation: Cross-tenant data access**
- Sequence: POST /users (tenant A) -> GET /users/{id} (tenant B token)
- User created by tenant A is accessible with tenant B's credentials
- Impact: Multi-tenant isolation breach
**3. 500 Error: Unhandled integer overflow**
- Request: POST /orders {"quantity": 2147483648}
- Response: 500 Internal Server Error with stack trace
- Impact: DoS potential, information disclosure via stack trace
### Coverage
- Endpoints covered: 38/42 (90.5%)
- Uncovered: POST /admin/migrate, DELETE /admin/cache,
PUT /config/advanced, POST /webhooks/test