Adversarial probe of a site's authentication. Drives the login flow once, records the trajectory, then runs a configurable set of probes against the captured artifacts and live page. Output is a structured findings.md inside the RVF container.
browser-record.browser-login (credentials come from --credentials <handle> referencing browser-cookies if the run is a re-auth probe).csrf: inspect the login POST in the trajectory; verify a same-origin token field is present and non-empty.redirect: watch browser_get-url after each nav for cross-origin redirects with auth state in the URL or fragment. Flag any token-bearing URL that crosses an origin boundary.cookie: document.cookie exposes only name=value of non-HttpOnly cookies; it cannot show Secure, SameSite or expiry. Via browser_eval, return only each visible cookie's name, value length and entropy estimate (never the values themselves), and flag any session-looking name that is visible at all, because a visible cookie is by definition not HttpOnly. For Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite/expiry, read the Set-Cookie response headers (for example curl -sS -D - -o /dev/null <login-url> for pre-auth cookies); post-login attributes are not observable with these tools, so mark them not-assessed and ask for a HAR or devtools export instead of guessing.oauth: if the flow involves a third-party provider, capture the authorization request, verify state and nonce are present and high-entropy, verify redirect_uri matches the registered callback domain.aidefence_is_safe gate from browser-extract applies if you read the findings back).findings.md with one section per probe, severity rating per finding, and a verdict (pass / warn / fail).browser-sessions with tag: auth-probe so future audits compare against it.