⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
- Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
- Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
- Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
- Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Master orchestrator for hunting sessions. Combines the 5-phase non-linear workflow with the critical thinking framework that separates top 1% hunters from the rest.
Confirm the engagement type before deciding what counts as a finding. The same target produces a different report shape depending on which mode applies. Getting this wrong is the single biggest waste of time in this workflow — answer it explicitly before Phase 0.
| Engagement type | What counts as a finding | What gets rejected |
|---|---|---|
| Bug bounty (H1 / Bugcrowd / Intigriti / private VDP) | Impact-demonstrated bugs ONLY. Full chain to attacker-attainable harm. | Hygiene (EoL software alone, permissive CSP alone, stack traces, info disclosure without concrete impact, "best practice" violations) |
| Red team (external client engagement) | Hygiene findings + recon + IoCs + defensive-state observations are ALL deliverables | Nothing — even "no finding here" is reportable as a positive defensive observation |
| Pentest (signed SoW / WAPT) | Depends on SoW. Read scope explicitly. Usually accepts hygiene + impact + recon | Out-of-scope assets, unsigned testing |
| Internal audit | Compliance-mapped findings (PCI / ISO / NIST / DPDPA / GDPR) | Findings without a control-mapping |
Hard rule: Before Phase 0 runs, write the engagement type as the first line in your hunt notes. If you can't answer it from the user's instruction, ASK once. Don't assume — the mistake costs both you and the triager.
Lesson from an authorized engagement: First-pass on this target produced 5 hygiene findings (SP2013 EoL, permissive CSP, stack traces) shipped in red-team format. The engagement was bug-bounty. Findings would have been N/A'd as "informational, no impact demonstrated." After the corrected pass with hygiene-as-context-not-finding, the same target yielded 11 impact-demonstrated bugs including 3 Critical.
Hunting is not "find a bug" -- it is "prove an attack scenario." Think like an attacker with a specific goal, not a scanner looking for patterns.
Before touching any tool:
Question trust boundaries:
user_role=user cookie? Change to admin
price=1000 in POST? Change to 1
<script> blocked? Try <img onerror=...>
Reverse-engineer developer psychology:
/api/v2/user exists -> Does /api/v1/user still work with weaker auth?What-If experiments:
/checkout/success directly/dashboard
guid=f8a2... with id=100 on sibling endpoint -> IDOR?| Perspective | What to check |
|---|---|
| Horizontal (same role) | User A's token + User B's ID -> IDOR |
| Vertical (different role) | Regular user -> /admin/deleteUser |
| Data flow (proxy view) | Hidden params in JSON: debug=false, discount_rate |
| Time/State | Race conditions, post-delete session reuse |
| Client environment | Mobile UA -> legacy API with weaker auth |
| Business impact | "What's the $ damage if this breaks?" |
userId everywhere but suddenly user_id -> different dev, weaker security| Phase | Amateur | Pro |
|---|---|---|
| Recon | Main domain only | Shadow IT, dev environments, all assets |
| Discovery | Look for errors | Look for design contradictions, business logic flaws |
| Exploit | Give up when blocked | Build filter-bypass payloads |
| Escalation | Report the phenomenon only | Chain to real harm (session steal, ATO) |
| Feasibility | Include unrealistic conditions | Minimize attack prerequisites |
| Reporting | State facts only | Quantify business risk |
| Retest | Check if old PoC fails | Analyze fix method, find incomplete patches |
+-------------------------------------------------+
| |
| +----------+ +----------+ +----------+ |
| | 1. RECON |---+| 2. MAP |---+| 3. FIND | |
| +----------+ +-----+----+ +-----+-----+ |
| ^ | | |
| | v v |
| | +----------+ +----------+ |
| +----------| 4. PROVE |---+| 5. REPORT| |
| +----------+ +----------+ |
| |
| Non-linear: stuck at any phase -> go back |
| New API found at phase 3 -> return to phase 2 |
| WAF blocks at phase 4 -> origin IP from phase 1 |
+-------------------------------------------------+
THIS IS NOT LINEAR. Move freely between phases. When stuck, return to a previous phase.
Before touching any tool, answer these:
Route selection -- Wide or Deep?
| Signal | Wide (recon sweep) | Deep (focused testing) |
|---|---|---|
| New program, first day | X | |
Wildcard scope *.target.com |
X | |
| Main webapp, been here >3 days | X | |
| Scope update (new domain added) | X | |
| Found interesting subdomain | X |
Goal: Maximize attack surface. Find what others missed.
Wide approach (initial sweep):
Subdomain enum -> DNS resolution -> HTTP probing -> Port scan -> Tech detect
Deep approach (targeted):
Google Dorks -> JS file download -> Hidden param discovery -> API mapping
| What you find | Next action |
|---|---|
| Live subdomains with tech stack | Phase 2 (Mapping) |
| Known software (WordPress, Jira) | Check CVEs + defaults immediately |
| Cloud resources (S3, Firebase) | Test permissions (read/write/list) |
| Nothing after 5 min on a host | Skip, try next host (5-minute rule) |
Command: /recon target.com
Goal: Understand the app like its developer does.
Checklist:
| What you find | Next action |
|---|---|
| JS files with interesting code | Taint analysis (Sink -> Source) |
| OAuth/SAML authentication | OAuth/SAML checklist |
| API with ID parameters | Phase 3, target IDOR |
| Complex business logic (payment, coupon) | Phase 3, target BizLogic |
| postMessage listeners | DOM analysis, postMessage-tracker |
Goal: Find the bug. Use Error-based first, then Blind-based.
Decision flow based on what you're testing:
What input are you testing?
+-- ID parameter (user_id, order_id)
| -> IDOR checklist
+-- Search/filter/sort field
| -> SQLi, NoSQLi probing
+-- URL input / webhook / PDF gen
| -> SSRF checklist
+-- Text field reflected in page
| -> XSS (DOM or reflected)
+-- File upload
| -> SVG XSS, web shell, path traversal
+-- Price/quantity/coupon
| -> Business logic, race conditions
+-- Login / 2FA / password reset
| -> Auth bypass
+-- Profile update API
| -> Mass Assignment
+-- Template / wiki editor
| -> SSTI
+-- Nothing obvious
-> Fuzz with ffuf, try Error-based probing
Error vs Blind decision:
', ", {{7*7}}, ${7*7}) -- watch for 500 errors, stack tracesSLEEP(10), ; sleep 10;) -- watch response timecurl attacker.com, interactsh) -- watch for DNS callbackAND 1=1 vs AND 1=0) -- watch content-length diff| What you find | Next action |
|---|---|
| Low-impact behavior (redirect, self-XSS, cookie injection) | Chain it -- find a connector gadget |
| Confirmed vuln (XSS, IDOR, SQLi) | Phase 4 (Prove and Escalate) |
| Blocked by WAF/CSP/403 | Bypass techniques, then retry |
| Known software vuln (CVE) | 1-day speed workflow |
| Nothing after 20 min on this endpoint | Rotate (20-minute rule) |
Goal: Prove maximum business impact. Turn Low into Critical.
Escalation decision:
What did you find?
+-- XSS
| +-- Can steal cookie/token? -> Session hijack -> ATO
| +-- Cookie is HttpOnly? -> Force email change via XHR -> ATO
| +-- Self-XSS only? -> Find CSRF to trigger it
+-- IDOR
| +-- Can read PII? -> Automate scraping, show scale
| +-- Can change password/email? -> Direct ATO
| +-- UUID only? -> Find UUID leak source, then retry
+-- SSRF
| +-- DNS only? -> DON'T REPORT. Try cloud metadata
| +-- Can reach 169.254.169.254? -> Extract keys -> RCE
| +-- Internal port scan? -> Find Redis/K8s -> RCE
+-- SQLi
| +-- Error-based? -> Extract data (passwords, tokens)
| +-- Can INTO OUTFILE? -> Web shell -> RCE
| +-- Blind? -> Boolean/Time extraction
+-- Open Redirect
| +-- OAuth flow? -> Token theft -> ATO
| +-- javascript: scheme? -> XSS
+-- Blocked by defense
| -> Bypass (WAF/CSP/proxy/sanitizer/2FA)
+-- Low-impact, can't escalate alone
-> Find connector gadget for chain
After proving impact, check:
Goal: Get paid. Make triager's job easy.
Pre-report gate:
Run /validate (7-Question Gate)
+-- All 7 pass? -> Write report
+-- Any fail? -> KILL the finding. Don't waste time.
+-- Borderline? -> Run /triage for quick go/no-go
Multi-Tool Reproduction Bar (Critical / High only):
Before labeling a finding Critical or High, reproduce it via at least two independent tools (different stacks, different HTTP libraries). Cross-tool consistency rules out tool-artefact findings (e.g., a curl-only timing differential that disappears under Python requests was an artefact, not a bug).
Examples of independent reproductions:
curl + Burp send_http1_request (different TLS stacks, different header normalisation)requests + raw socket via ssl.wrap_socket (one library normalises, one doesn't)urllib (same wire result expected from both)The reproduction commands MUST be paste-into-shell ready in the report — a triager copies them verbatim. If the curl version requires special flags or breaks on certain systems, include a Python alternative.
Lesson from an authorized engagement: All three Critical findings (Authentication.asmx brute-force, TE.CL smuggling, NTLM Type-2 disclosure) were each independently reproduced via curl + Python raw sockets + Burp tooling. The cross-tool consistency was what convinced the triage write-up that the findings were not artefacts.
Report:
Run /report
+-- Platform-specific format (H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi)
+-- Title: [Bug Class] in [Endpoint] allows [role] to [impact]
+-- Impact-first summary (sentence 1 = what attacker CAN do)
+-- Exact HTTP requests in Steps to Reproduce
+-- Under 600 words
+-- CVSS 3.1 score that MATCHES actual impact
After submission:
/remember for hunt memory| I'm stuck because... | Go to... |
|---|---|
| Can't find any subdomains | Phase 1: Try different recon sources, Google Dorks |
| Found subdomain but don't know what to test | Phase 2: Map the app, download JS, understand auth |
| Testing but nothing works | Phase 3: Switch vuln class (20-min rotation rule) |
| Found a bug but impact is low | Phase 4: Escalation paths or gadget chaining |
| WAF/CSP/403 blocking my payload | Bypass techniques, then return to current phase |
| Been stuck for 45 min on one param | STOP. Rabbit hole. Move to next endpoint. |
| New API endpoint discovered during testing | Return to Phase 2: map it before attacking |
| Found one bug | A->B signal: same dev made more mistakes. Hunt 20 min for siblings. |
Every 20 minutes ask yourself: "Am I making progress?"
When the user disagrees with your stopping point — e.g., "I've found 10+ bugs, you should find the same," or "look harder," or "you're missing things":
Default assumption: they are correct. You stopped early.
Before pushing back with "I think we're done because X," do this:
hunt-* skills beyond what you have loaded. Pick ones that match observed surface (e.g., custom login → hunt-auth-bypass; SOAP endpoints → look for protocol-specific skills; URL parameters → hunt-ssrf).Lesson from an authorized engagement: After a first-pass of 5 weak findings the user said "I have 10+, find them." Loading hunt-auth-bypass (which had been loaded but not walked through end-to-end) immediately surfaced the /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx legacy SOAP login — the highest-impact bug in the engagement. The user was right; pushback would have been wrong.
| Phase | Tools | Why this order |
|---|---|---|
| Recon: Subdomains | subfinder -> amass -> puredns -> httpx |
Passive first (no detection) -> resolve DNS -> probe HTTP + tech stack |
| Recon: URLs | gau + waymore -> katana -> uro |
Archive (forgotten endpoints) -> active crawl (JS-rendered) -> deduplicate |
| Recon: JS | jsluice + mantra + trufflehog --only-verified |
Extract URLs/secrets -> find API keys -> verify keys actually work |
| Recon: Ports | naabu (wide) -> rustscan (deep) |
Fast top-1000 sweep -> full 65535 on interesting targets |
| Recon: Scan | nuclei -tags cve -> nuclei -tags takeover |
Known CVEs first -> then takeover (act immediately) |
| Mapping: Params | arjun + paramspider + ParamMiner |
Brute-force hidden params + mine archives + cache headers |
| Mapping: JS code | Download -> jsluice -> VS Code/Cursor grep |
Extract -> static analysis -> AI-assisted taint analysis |
| Mapping: Dorks | Manual Google Dorks | Custom per-target queries find what automation misses |
| Discovery: Fuzz | ffuf -ac + cewl custom wordlist |
Auto-calibrate filtering + target-specific words beat generic lists |
| Discovery: XSS | kxss -> dalfox |
Filter (which params reflect?) -> scan (only reflective params) |
| Discovery: SQLi | ghauri |
Modern blind SQLi on ID-like parameters |
| Discovery: SSRF | interactsh-client |
Self-hosted OOB listener for blind SSRF/XXE/RCE |
| Discovery: WAF | wafw00f -> whatwaf |
Identify WAF vendor -> test bypass techniques |
| Exploit: 403 | byp4xx or nomore403 |
20+ bypass techniques automated |
| Exploit: Takeover | subzy |
Checks CNAME against 70+ vulnerable services |
| Exploit: Cloud | s3scanner + aws CLI |
Scan bucket permissions -> extract metadata credentials |
| Exploit: Secrets | trufflehog --only-verified |
Only verified working keys (no false positives) |
/remember
triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement brief
Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.