⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY
This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate
Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Missing HttpOnly on cookies may be detected by separately configured tooling — focus your active testing on lifecycle invalidation (higher impact).
Pattern 1 — Session survives logout (most common high-value finding):
/logout, POST /api/logout, etc.)/api/me, /dashboard, /account)Pattern 2 — Session not regenerated on login (session fixation):
Pattern 3 — Session survives password change:
Content-type: Login and session endpoints vary — use application/json for REST APIs, application/x-www-form-urlencoded for traditional web forms. Try both if the first returns an unexpected response.
Proof: A protected-resource 200 response (with user data) using a session token that should have been invalidated confirms the finding.
Session fixation leading to admin hijack = Critical. Session surviving a password change = High-to-Critical (persistent ATO from a stolen cookie that the victim believes they revoked by resetting their password).
Highest-value chains:
/logout → theft window never closes.exp / no revocation list — inspect server-enforced lifetime and revocation; claims alone do not establish permanent access.No invented CVE/report IDs below. These are the named, publicly-documented patterns this skill encodes:
SameSite=Lax as its only CSRF defence.__Host-/__Secure- prefixes per RFC 6265bis. Missing HttpOnly can be a hardening finding; high-impact theft claims require an actual applicable attack path (chain with hunt-xss/hunt-dom).Cross-refs: ATO chaining → hunt-ato; JWT alg/kid tampering → hunt-api-misconfig; OAuth code/state flaws → hunt-oauth; CSRF mechanics → hunt-csrf; cookie-theft sinks → hunt-xss / hunt-dom.
Set-Cookie: session=... # name varies: sid, JSESSIONID, connect.sid,
# PHPSESSID, ASP.NET_SessionId, laravel_session, _csrf
/login /logout /api/login /oauth/token
/auth/refresh /api/token/refresh # refresh-token rotation surface
/account/change-password /settings/email
?sid= ?session= in URL # session-in-URL → leaks via Referer/logs (finding)
# Header signals worth flagging immediately:
Set-Cookie: session=abc; Path=/ # no HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite
Set-Cookie: session=abc; SameSite=None # None without Secure = rejected by modern browsers, but flag
Set-Cookie: __Host-sess=...; Secure; Path=/ # GOOD — hard to fixate
Sec-Session-Registration: ... # DBSC in play → test downgrade
Two-session rule. Every invalidation/fixation claim is proven with TWO concrete sessions captured by a real flow — attacker A and victim B — never with hardcoded placeholder strings. Helpers below capture real cookies from curl's Netscape jar.
TARGET=target.com
JAR_A=$(mktemp); JAR_B=$(mktemp)
# Robust session-cookie extractor: handles #HttpOnly_ prefix lines and any
# cookie name (sid/JSESSIONID/connect.sid/PHPSESSID/...). Prints name=value.
get_cookie () { # $1=jar $2=name-regex (default: common session names)
local jar="$1" re="${2:-session|sid|sess|JSESSIONID|connect\.sid|PHPSESSID|laravel_session}"
awk -v re="$re" '
/^#HttpOnly_/ { sub(/^#HttpOnly_/,""); } # strip jar HttpOnly marker
/^#/ { next } # skip remaining comments
NF>=7 && $6 ~ re { print $6"="$7 } # field6=name field7=value
' "$jar" | tail -1
}
# Step 1: grab a pre-auth session the SERVER hands an anonymous client.
curl -s -L -c "$JAR_A" "https://$TARGET/login" -o /dev/null
PRE=$(get_cookie "$JAR_A"); echo "pre-auth: $PRE"
# Step 1b (stronger): can we FORCE an arbitrary ID? attacker-chosen value.
FIX="session=AAAAdeadbeefAAAA"
# Step 2: authenticate while CARRYING the pre-auth/forced cookie (reuse same jar).
curl -s -L -c "$JAR_A" -b "$JAR_A" -X POST "https://$TARGET/login" \
-d "username=attacker@example.com&password=CorrectHorse1" -o /dev/null
POST=$(get_cookie "$JAR_A"); echo "post-auth: $POST"
# DECISION:
# - If $POST == $PRE (value unchanged across the auth boundary) AND that value
# now returns authenticated data → FIXATION. The server reused the anon ID.
# - If the forced $FIX value is accepted and authenticates → CRITICAL fixation
# (attacker controls the ID; no email/XSS needed to plant it).
AUTH=$(curl -s -L -b "$JAR_A" "https://$TARGET/api/me")
echo "$AUTH" | head -c 200
FP guard: a value change is not automatically safe — some apps rotate the readable cookie but keep a stable server-side session keyed by a second cookie. Diff the FULL Set-Cookie set and confirm the old value is genuinely dead (Phase 2). Also confirm /api/me returns your identity, not a generic 200/landing page.
# A logs in for real (fresh jar), capture A's live session.
curl -s -L -c "$JAR_A" -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"attacker@example.com","password":"CorrectHorse1"}' -o /dev/null
A=$(get_cookie "$JAR_A"); echo "A=$A"
# Baseline: what does an authenticated /api/me look like for A? (capture body, not just code)
BEFORE=$(curl -s -L -b "$JAR_A" "https://$TARGET/api/me")
# Logout A.
curl -s -L -b "$JAR_A" -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/logout" -o /dev/null
# Replay A's OLD cookie value explicitly (do NOT reuse the jar — logout may have
# overwritten it). Compare body + code against the authenticated baseline.
AFTER=$(curl -s -L -H "Cookie: $A" "https://$TARGET/api/me" -w '\n[%{http_code}]')
echo "AFTER: $AFTER"
FP discipline (mandatory):
AFTER against BEFORE — the finding is only real if AFTER still contains A's unique identity marker (email, user-id, CSRF token, account name).# This is the real two-session flow. A = attacker holding a stolen/old session.
# B = the victim who changes their password believing it revokes access.
# (In a real engagement A is a session you legitimately captured for a TEST account
# that you also control as B — never use a real third party.)
# 1) Log the TEST account in as session A, capture it.
curl -s -L -c "$JAR_A" -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"victim@example.com","password":"OldPass!1"}' -o /dev/null
SESSION_A=$(get_cookie "$JAR_A"); echo "SESSION_A=$SESSION_A"
BEFORE=$(curl -s -L -H "Cookie: $SESSION_A" "https://$TARGET/api/profile")
# 2) Log the SAME account in as session B (separate jar = "the victim's browser").
curl -s -L -c "$JAR_B" -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"victim@example.com","password":"OldPass!1"}' -o /dev/null
# 3) Victim (session B) changes the password.
curl -s -L -b "$JAR_B" -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/change-password" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"old_password":"OldPass!1","new_password":"BrandNew!2"}' -o /dev/null
# 4) THE TEST: replay the OLD SESSION_A captured in step 1.
AFTER=$(curl -s -L -H "Cookie: $SESSION_A" "https://$TARGET/api/profile" -w '\n[%{http_code}]')
echo "AFTER pw-change: $AFTER"
Decision + FP discipline:
AFTER returns 200 and the body still carries the account's unique data (body-diff vs BEFORE). A bare 200 on a public/SPA route is not proof./settings/email) and for logout-all-devices — apps frequently invalidate the acting session (B) but not sibling sessions (A). That sibling-survival is the exact persistent-ATO primitive hunt-ato chains.hunt-mfa-bypass), A can pivot from read-only to full takeover → escalate.curl -sI -L "https://$TARGET/" | grep -i '^set-cookie'
document.cookie. A hardening observation whose severity requires context; a demonstrated XSS/DOM sink can establish a theft chain (hunt-xss/hunt-dom) — note it, don't report standalone as High.hunt-tls-network (downgrade/HSTS-gap) for a network-attacker chain.None → CSRF reachability; sibling subdomains may be same-site, so Lax alone is not sufficient (Argo CD CVE-2024-22424 class) → hand to hunt-csrf.__Host- / __Secure- prefix absent → record cookie scope and transport hardening; absence alone does not prove overwrite or fixation, and presence does not replace lifecycle validation.# Collect a LARGE sample (200+) of freshly-issued IDs. -L is required: a 302
# /login often sets the cookie on the redirect target, not the first response.
N=200; SAMP=$(mktemp)
for i in $(seq 1 $N); do
J=$(mktemp)
curl -s -L -c "$J" "https://$TARGET/login" -o /dev/null
get_cookie "$J" | cut -d= -f2- >> "$SAMP"
rm -f "$J"
done
sort "$SAMP" | uniq -d | head # duplicates need investigation: stable sessions/rate limits/error responses can repeat without cross-user reuse
awk '{print length($0)}' "$SAMP" | sort -n | uniq -c # length distribution
Then analyse, don't eyeball:
sort -n the decoded values; a steady +1/+N delta = predictable.base64 -d / hex-decode each ID and look for embedded userId, unix timestamps, or PIDs.ent or dieharder; Small samples cannot establish cryptographic entropy; review generation design and the applicable standard. 10 samples is far too few to claim anything — gather hundreds.JWT="eyJ..." # captured from Authorization: Bearer or a cookie
# Decode header + payload safely (base64url padding fix).
b64url(){ local s="${1//-/+}"; s="${s//_//}"; printf '%s' "$s===" | base64 -d 2>/dev/null; }
b64url "$(cut -d. -f1 <<<"$JWT")" | jq . # header: alg, kid
b64url "$(cut -d. -f2 <<<"$JWT")" | jq . # claims: exp, iat, sub, jti
exp missing or years out → inspect enforced server-side lifetime; claims alone do not prove permanent access. jti missing does not prove absent revocation: servers can revoke by token hash, session, user version or other state./api/me. If it still returns the user → tokens are not server-revocable; this is the JWT-session persistence finding. Body-diff to avoid a cached 200.hunt-api-misconfig — hand off jwt_tool $JWT -T / -X a there rather than duplicating it.# 1) Obtain a refresh token (login or /oauth/token), then rotate it once.
RT1=$(curl -s -L -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"victim@example.com","password":"OldPass!1"}' | jq -r '.refresh_token')
# 2) Use RT1 to mint a new access token — check the configured protection: rotation or sender-constraining; this example tests rotation only.
R2=$(curl -s -L -X POST "https://$TARGET/auth/refresh" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"refresh_token\":\"$RT1\"}")
RT2=$(jq -r '.refresh_token' <<<"$R2"); echo "rotated? RT1!=RT2 -> $([ "$RT1" != "$RT2" ] && echo yes || echo NO-ROTATION)"
# 3) REUSE-DETECTION test: replay the OLD RT1 again (simulating the leaked token).
REPLAY=$(curl -s -L -X POST "https://$TARGET/auth/refresh" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"refresh_token\":\"$RT1\"}" -w '\n[%{http_code}]')
echo "RT1 replay: $REPLAY"
# 4) Then confirm RT2 was KILLED by the replay (correct BCP behaviour invalidates
# the whole family). If RT2 still works after RT1 was replayed → no family-revocation.
curl -s -L -X POST "https://$TARGET/auth/refresh" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"refresh_token\":\"$RT2\"}" -w '\n[%{http_code}]'
Interpretation: no rotation requires checking sender-constraining and client type; rotation without reuse-detection (RT1 replay still mints tokens, or RT2 survives the replay) = the leaked-token-persistence bug per the OAuth Security BCP. OOB note: if you suspect a leaked RT via SSRF/log/JS-bundle, confirm the token's reach with hunt-ssrf/hunt-source-leak, not by guessing.
# SSO linkage: after IdP callback, is the app session bound to the IdP session?
# - Log out at the IdP only; replay the app session cookie. Still 200 with user
# data → app session outlives the IdP session (single-logout gap).
# DBSC downgrade: if responses carry Sec-Session-Registration / Sec-Session-Id,
# strip the device-bound proof header and replay the plain cookie:
curl -s -L -H "Cookie: $A" "https://$TARGET/api/me" -w '\n[%{http_code}]'
# If the plain (non-bound) cookie is still accepted → device-binding is advisory,
# inspect the refresh challenge and cookie lifetime; acceptance alone does not demonstrate a DBSC downgrade.
Hand OAuth state/redirect_uri/code-injection to hunt-oauth; this phase only covers the session-layer binding.
| Session finding | Chain to | Impact |
|---|---|---|
Session fixation (forced __Host--less cookie) | Trick admin/SSO user into authenticating on planted ID | Admin session takeover (Critical) |
| No logout/password-change invalidation | hunt-xss/hunt-dom cookie theft → replay surviving session | Persistent ATO past victim's reset |
| Refresh token, no reuse-detection | Leaked RT (SSRF/log/bundle) → access-token minting within the demonstrated lifetime | Persistent ATO, survives password change |
SameSite=Lax only | Sibling-subdomain top-level nav (CVE-2024-22424 class) → CSRF | State change / login-CSRF → fixation |
| JWT lifetime/revocation failure | Demonstrated replay after expected expiry/revocation | Demonstrated post-logout access within observed lifetime |
| DBSC downgrade accepted | Steal plain cookie despite device-binding | Defeats the only theft mitigation |
| Predictable ID | Compute/brute another user's session | Cross-user ATO |
Before claiming ANY session finding:
curl flows above.HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite absence is a policy observation; only report as High once paired with a real exploit primitive (XSS, network-MITM, CSRF). Standalone attribute gaps are Low/Informational.Severity:
HttpOnly/SameSite standalone: Low/Informational until chainedtriage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement brief
Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.
These commands are endpoint-specific sketches, not an automatic detector. Use only controlled test accounts and pre-approved routes/rates; do not recruit or trick real users. Keep cookies, credentials and response bodies in private temporary artifacts rather than console/chat output; redact evidence and clean it up under the engagement retention rules. Do not follow redirects outside the authorized origin or send credential bodies across an unexpected redirect. The cookie extractor ignores domain/path and can select the wrong cookie; validate the exact cookie scope and include any companion cookies. A stable pre/post cookie, absent cookie prefix, surviving password-change session or absent jti is not independently proof of takeover; establish attacker controllability, expected revocation semantics and real protected data access. Sender-constrained refresh tokens can satisfy RFC 9700 without rotation; apply the appropriate client threat model. IdP and RP sessions can be independent unless single logout is promised. DBSC deliberately allows short-lived cookies: plain-cookie acceptance before expiry does not by itself defeat refresh-time device binding. SameSite is site-based, so sibling subdomains may be same-site; do not infer a general Lax bypass from a named CVE without reproducing its actual preconditions. Statistical tests on hundreds of tokens cannot certify entropy or the RNG. Severity is evidence/program dependent, not fixed by these tables.