MindTickle integrations process employee PII through SCIM provisioning (names, emails, job titles, manager chains) and HR-sensitive data like course completion scores, certification status, and coaching assessments. The API uses bearer token authentication combined with a Company-Id header for multi-tenant isolation — omitting or spoofing this header can leak data across tenants. Webhook payloads carrying training completion events must be HMAC-verified to prevent injection of fraudulent compliance records.
Company-Id validated against an allowlist of known tenant identifiers.env files in .gitignore — never committed to version control// MindTickle requires both bearer token and company ID for multi-tenant isolation
const MT_API_TOKEN = process.env.MINDTICKLE_API_KEY;
const MT_COMPANY_ID = process.env.MINDTICKLE_COMPANY_ID;
function validateMindTickleConfig(): void {
if (!MT_API_TOKEN) throw new Error('Missing MINDTICKLE_API_KEY');
if (!MT_COMPANY_ID) throw new Error('Missing MINDTICKLE_COMPANY_ID');
}
function mindtickleHeaders(): Record<string, string> {
return {
Authorization: `Bearer ${MT_API_TOKEN}`,
'Company-Id': MT_COMPANY_ID!,
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
};
}
// Call validateMindTickleConfig() at startup — both values are required for every request
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
const MT_WEBHOOK_SECRET = process.env.MINDTICKLE_WEBHOOK_SECRET!;
function verifyMindTickleWebhook(payload: string, signature: string, timestamp: string): boolean {
// Reject stale webhooks (>5 min) to prevent replay attacks
const age = Date.now() - parseInt(timestamp, 10) * 1000;
if (age > 300_000) return false;
const signedPayload = `${timestamp}.${payload}`;
const expected = crypto
.createHmac('sha256', MT_WEBHOOK_SECRET)
.update(signedPayload, 'utf8')
.digest('hex');
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(signature), Buffer.from(expected));
}
app.post('/webhooks/mindtickle', (req, res) => {
const sig = req.headers['x-mindtickle-signature'] as string;
const ts = req.headers['x-mindtickle-timestamp'] as string;
if (!sig || !ts || !verifyMindTickleWebhook(JSON.stringify(req.body), sig, ts)) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid signature or stale timestamp' });
}
// Process verified training completion event
});
// Validate SCIM user payloads — employee PII requires strict schema enforcement
interface ScimUser {
userName: string;
name: { givenName: string; familyName: string };
emails: { value: string; primary: boolean }[];
}
function validateScimUser(user: unknown): user is ScimUser {
const u = user as Record<string, unknown>;
if (typeof u.userName !== 'string' || u.userName.length > 254) return false;
const emails = u.emails as { value: string }[] | undefined;
if (!emails?.every(e => /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(e.value))) return false;
return true;
}
function redactEmployeeData(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
const piiFields = ['email', 'userName', 'phone', 'manager_email', 'employee_id'];
const hrFields = ['score', 'certification_status', 'coaching_notes'];
const redacted = { ...record };
for (const field of [...piiFields, ...hrFields]) {
if (redacted[field]) redacted[field] = '[REDACTED]';
}
return redacted;
}
// Redact before logging — course scores and coaching data are HR-confidential
// Enforce tenant isolation — Company-Id must match the authenticated context
const ALLOWED_COMPANY_IDS = new Set(process.env.MT_ALLOWED_COMPANIES?.split(',') ?? []);
function assertTenantAccess(companyId: string): void {
if (!ALLOWED_COMPANY_IDS.has(companyId)) {
throw new Error(`Unauthorized tenant: ${companyId}`);
}
}
function assertScimWriteAccess(operation: string, hasScimScope: boolean): void {
const writeOps = ['createUser', 'updateUser', 'deactivateUser'];
if (writeOps.includes(operation) && !hasScimScope) {
throw new Error(`SCIM write operation "${operation}" requires scim:write scope`);
}
}
| Vulnerability | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Missing Company-Id header | Cross-tenant data leakage | Reject requests without validated Company-Id |
| Unverified webhooks | Fraudulent training completion records | HMAC-SHA256 + timestamp validation on every webhook |
| SCIM PII in logs | Employee data breach (GDPR/SOC2) | Redact all PII fields before logging |
| Stale webhook replay | Duplicate or backdated compliance events | Reject webhooks older than 5 minutes |
| Over-permissioned SCIM token | Unauthorized user provisioning | Enforce scim:write scope check for mutations |
See mindtickle-prod-checklist.