Do not use for AWS-only environments where AWS Secrets Manager suffices without multi-cloud requirements, for application-level encryption logic (though Vault Transit can help), or for identity federation (see managing-cloud-identity-with-okta).
Deploy Vault using Integrated Storage (Raft) for HA without external dependencies. Configure TLS, audit logging, and auto-unseal using a cloud KMS.
# vault-config.hcl
storage "raft" {
path = "/opt/vault/data"
node_id = "vault-node-1"
retry_join {
leader_api_addr = "https://vault-node-2.internal:8200"
}
retry_join {
leader_api_addr = "https://vault-node-3.internal:8200"
}
}
listener "tcp" {
address = "0.0.0.0:8200"
tls_cert_file = "/opt/vault/tls/vault.crt"
tls_key_file = "/opt/vault/tls/vault.key"
}
seal "awskms" {
region = "us-east-1"
kms_key_id = "alias/vault-unseal-key"
}
api_addr = "https://vault-node-1.internal:8200"
cluster_addr = "https://vault-node-1.internal:8201"
telemetry {
prometheus_retention_time = "30s"
disable_hostname = true
}
# Initialize Vault
vault operator init -key-shares=5 -key-threshold=3
# Enable audit logging
vault audit enable file file_path=/var/log/vault/audit.log
# Enable syslog audit for SIEM integration
vault audit enable syslog tag="vault" facility="AUTH"
Enable authentication backends for human operators, applications, and CI/CD pipelines. Use AppRole for machine authentication and OIDC for human access.
# Enable OIDC auth for human users via Okta
vault auth enable oidc
vault write auth/oidc/config \
oidc_discovery_url="https://company.okta.com/oauth2/default" \
oidc_client_id="vault-client-id" \
oidc_client_secret="vault-client-secret" \
default_role="default"
# Enable AppRole for application authentication
vault auth enable approle
vault write auth/approle/role/web-app \
secret_id_ttl=10m \
token_num_uses=10 \
token_ttl=20m \
token_max_ttl=30m \
secret_id_num_uses=1 \
token_policies="web-app-policy"
# Enable Kubernetes auth for pod-based access
vault auth enable kubernetes
vault write auth/kubernetes/config \
kubernetes_host="https://kubernetes.default.svc:443" \
token_reviewer_jwt=@/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token \
kubernetes_ca_cert=@/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
Configure database secret engines to generate short-lived credentials on demand. Each credential set has a TTL and is automatically revoked when it expires.
# Enable database secrets engine for PostgreSQL
vault secrets enable database
vault write database/config/production-db \
plugin_name=postgresql-database-plugin \
allowed_roles="readonly,readwrite" \
connection_url="postgresql://{{username}}:{{password}}@db.internal:5432/production?sslmode=require" \
username="vault_admin" \
password="initial-password"
# Rotate the root credentials so Vault manages them exclusively
vault write -force database/rotate-root/production-db
# Create a readonly role with 1-hour TTL
vault write database/roles/readonly \
db_name=production-db \
creation_statements="CREATE ROLE \"{{name}}\" WITH LOGIN PASSWORD '{{password}}' VALID UNTIL '{{expiration}}'; GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO \"{{name}}\";" \
revocation_statements="REVOKE ALL ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public FROM \"{{name}}\"; DROP ROLE IF EXISTS \"{{name}}\";" \
default_ttl="1h" \
max_ttl="24h"
# Enable AWS secrets engine for dynamic IAM credentials
vault secrets enable aws
vault write aws/config/root \
access_key=AKIAEXAMPLE \
secret_key=secretkey \
region=us-east-1
vault write aws/roles/deploy-role \
credential_type=iam_user \
policy_document=@deploy-policy.json \
default_sts_ttl=3600
Use the Vault Agent Injector or CSI Provider to deliver secrets to pods without application code changes. Secrets are rendered as files in a shared volume.
# Kubernetes deployment with Vault Agent Injector annotations
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: web-app
spec:
template:
metadata:
annotations:
vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject: "true"
vault.hashicorp.com/role: "web-app"
vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-secret-db-creds: "database/creds/readonly"
vault.hashicorp.com/agent-inject-template-db-creds: |
{{- with secret "database/creds/readonly" -}}
export DB_USERNAME="{{ .Data.username }}"
export DB_PASSWORD="{{ .Data.password }}"
{{- end }}
spec:
serviceAccountName: web-app
containers:
- name: web-app
image: company/web-app:v2.1
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", "source /vault/secrets/db-creds && ./start.sh"]
Use the Transit secrets engine for application-level encryption without managing keys in application code. Deploy the PKI engine for automatic TLS certificate management.
# Enable Transit engine for encryption as a service
vault secrets enable transit
vault write -f transit/keys/payment-data type=aes256-gcm96
# Encrypt sensitive data
vault write transit/encrypt/payment-data \
plaintext=$(echo "card-number-4111-1111-1111-1111" | base64)
# Enable PKI for internal certificate management
vault secrets enable pki
vault secrets tune -max-lease-ttl=87600h pki
# Generate root CA
vault write pki/root/generate/internal \
common_name="Internal Root CA" \
ttl=87600h
# Configure intermediate CA for issuing certificates
vault secrets enable -path=pki_int pki
vault write pki_int/intermediate/generate/internal \
common_name="Internal Intermediate CA" \
ttl=43800h
# Create a role for issuing certificates
vault write pki_int/roles/internal-services \
allowed_domains="internal.company.com" \
allow_subdomains=true \
max_ttl=720h
Define fine-grained ACL policies following least privilege. Enable comprehensive audit logging for all secret access and administrative operations.
# web-app-policy.hcl
path "database/creds/readonly" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "transit/encrypt/payment-data" {
capabilities = ["update"]
}
path "transit/decrypt/payment-data" {
capabilities = ["update"]
}
path "secret/data/web-app/*" {
capabilities = ["read", "list"]
}
# Deny access to admin paths
path "sys/*" {
capabilities = ["deny"]
}
# Apply the policy
vault policy write web-app-policy web-app-policy.hcl
# Verify audit log captures all operations
vault audit list -detailed
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Dynamic Secrets | Credentials generated on-demand with automatic expiration and revocation, eliminating long-lived static credentials |
| Secret Engine | Vault component that stores, generates, or encrypts data; includes KV, database, AWS, PKI, and Transit engines |
| Auto-Unseal | Cloud KMS-based mechanism that automatically unseals Vault nodes on restart without manual key entry |
| AppRole | Machine-oriented authentication method using Role ID and Secret ID for application and CI/CD pipeline access |
| Transit Engine | Encryption-as-a-service engine that handles cryptographic operations without exposing encryption keys to applications |
| Lease | Time-bound credential with a TTL that Vault automatically revokes on expiration unless renewed |
| Namespace | Vault Enterprise feature providing tenant isolation with separate auth, secrets, and policy management |
| Response Wrapping | Technique that wraps secret responses in a single-use token to prevent man-in-the-middle exposure during delivery |
Context: A DevOps team stores PostgreSQL credentials in GitHub Actions secrets and Jenkins credential stores. The same credentials are shared across staging and production environments with no rotation for 18 months.
Approach:
Pitfalls: Failing to rotate the original static credentials after Vault migration leaves the old credentials valid. Setting TTLs too short causes credential expiry mid-deployment for long-running jobs.
Vault Secrets Management Audit Report
=======================================
Vault Cluster: vault.internal.company.com
Version: 1.18.1 Enterprise
HA Mode: Raft (3 nodes)
Seal Type: AWS KMS Auto-Unseal
Report Date: 2025-02-23
SECRET ENGINES:
database/ PostgreSQL dynamic creds Leases Active: 47
aws/ Dynamic IAM credentials Leases Active: 12
transit/ Encryption as a service Keys: 8
pki/ Root CA Certs Issued: 0
pki_int/ Intermediate CA Certs Issued: 234
secret/ KV v2 static secrets Versions: 1,892
AUTH METHODS:
oidc/ Okta SSO for humans Active Tokens: 23
approle/ CI/CD pipelines Active Tokens: 156
kubernetes/ Pod-based auth Active Tokens: 89
AUDIT FINDINGS:
[WARN] 3 AppRole secret_id_num_uses set to 0 (unlimited)
[WARN] 12 KV secrets not accessed in 90+ days (potential orphans)
[PASS] All dynamic secret TTLs under 24 hours
[PASS] Audit logging enabled on all nodes
[PASS] Root token revoked after initial setup
CREDENTIAL HYGIENE:
Static Secrets (KV): 234
Dynamic Secrets Active: 59
Average Lease TTL: 2.3 hours
Secrets Rotated This Month: 12,456