Do not use against domains you do not have authorization to test, for DNS amplification or reflection attacks, or to overwhelm DNS servers with excessive query volumes.
# Find authoritative name servers
dig NS example.com +short
# ns1.example.com.
# ns2.example.com.
# Get SOA record for zone metadata
dig SOA example.com +short
# ns1.example.com. admin.example.com. 2024031501 3600 900 604800 86400
# Enumerate all common record types
dig example.com ANY +noall +answer
# Get MX records (mail servers)
dig MX example.com +short
# 10 mail.example.com.
# 20 mail-backup.example.com.
# Get TXT records (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, verification)
dig TXT example.com +short
# Check for DMARC policy
dig TXT _dmarc.example.com +short
# Check for DKIM selectors
dig TXT default._domainkey.example.com +short
dig TXT selector1._domainkey.example.com +short
dig TXT google._domainkey.example.com +short
# Get SRV records for common services
dig SRV _sip._tcp.example.com +short
dig SRV _ldap._tcp.example.com +short
dig SRV _kerberos._tcp.example.com +short
# Attempt AXFR zone transfer against each name server
dig AXFR example.com @ns1.example.com
dig AXFR example.com @ns2.example.com
# Use host command for zone transfer
host -t axfr example.com ns1.example.com
# Use dnsrecon for automated zone transfer attempts
dnsrecon -d example.com -t axfr
# If zone transfer succeeds, save the output
dig AXFR example.com @ns1.example.com > zone_transfer_results.txt
# Test for IXFR (incremental zone transfer)
dig IXFR=2024031500 example.com @ns1.example.com
# Use dnsenum for comprehensive enumeration
dnsenum --dnsserver ns1.example.com --enum -f /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -r example.com -o dnsenum_output.xml
# Use dnsrecon with brute force
dnsrecon -d example.com -t brt -D /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt
# Use gobuster for fast DNS brute forcing
gobuster dns -d example.com -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-20000.txt -t 50 -o gobuster_dns.txt
# Use subfinder for passive subdomain discovery
subfinder -d example.com -all -o subfinder_results.txt
# Use amass for comprehensive enumeration (passive + active)
amass enum -d example.com -passive -o amass_passive.txt
amass enum -d example.com -active -brute -o amass_active.txt
# Combine and deduplicate results
cat subfinder_results.txt amass_passive.txt amass_active.txt gobuster_dns.txt | sort -u > all_subdomains.txt
# Reverse DNS lookup on discovered IP ranges
dnsrecon -d example.com -t rvl -r 10.10.0.0/24
# PTR record enumeration for IP range
for ip in $(seq 1 254); do
result=$(dig -x 10.10.1.$ip +short 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$result" ]; then
echo "10.10.1.$ip -> $result"
fi
done
# Use Nmap for reverse DNS on a subnet
nmap -sL 10.10.0.0/24 | grep "(" | awk '{print $5, $6}'
# Check for DNS cache snooping (information about queried domains)
dig @ns1.example.com www.competitor.com +norecurse
# Check DNSSEC validation
dig example.com +dnssec +short
dig DNSKEY example.com +short
dig DS example.com +short
# Test for DNS rebinding vulnerability
# Check if the DNS server has a short TTL that could enable rebinding
dig example.com +noall +answer | grep -i ttl
# Check for open recursive resolver (misconfiguration)
dig @ns1.example.com google.com +recurse
# If it resolves, the server is an open resolver
# Check for wildcard DNS records
dig nonexistent-subdomain-xyz123.example.com +short
# If it resolves, a wildcard record exists
# Test DNS over HTTPS/TLS support
# DoH test
curl -s -H 'accept: application/dns-json' 'https://dns.google/resolve?name=example.com&type=A'
# Verify SPF record for email security
dig TXT example.com +short | grep "v=spf1"
# Check for overly permissive SPF (+all, ?all)
# Resolve all discovered subdomains to IP addresses
while read subdomain; do
ip=$(dig +short A "$subdomain" | head -1)
if [ -n "$ip" ]; then
echo "$subdomain,$ip"
fi
done < all_subdomains.txt > resolved_subdomains.csv
# Identify unique IP addresses and their locations
cut -d',' -f2 resolved_subdomains.csv | sort -u > unique_ips.txt
# Check for internal IP addresses leaked via DNS
grep -E "^10\.|^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|^192\.168\." resolved_subdomains.csv > internal_ip_leaks.txt
# Use httpx to probe web services on discovered subdomains
cat all_subdomains.txt | httpx -title -status-code -tech-detect -o httpx_results.txt
# Screenshot web services for documentation
cat all_subdomains.txt | httpx -screenshot -o screenshots/
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | DNS mechanism that replicates the complete zone file from a primary to secondary server; unauthorized transfers expose all records in the zone |
| Subdomain Enumeration | Process of discovering valid subdomains through brute force, certificate transparency logs, search engines, and passive DNS databases |
| DNSSEC | DNS Security Extensions that add cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and spoofing attacks |
| SPF/DKIM/DMARC | Email authentication protocols defined in DNS TXT records that prevent email spoofing and domain impersonation |
| Wildcard DNS | A DNS record using an asterisk (*) that matches any query for non-existent subdomains, potentially masking enumeration results |
| PTR Record | Reverse DNS record that maps an IP address to a hostname, often revealing internal naming conventions and server roles |
Context: A security consultant is performing external reconnaissance for a web application penetration test. The client's primary domain is example.com, and the scope includes all subdomains and related infrastructure. The consultant has authorization to enumerate DNS records and probe discovered web services.
Approach:
Pitfalls:
## DNS Enumeration Report
**Target Domain**: example.com
**Authorized Nameservers**: ns1.example.com (203.0.113.10), ns2.example.com (203.0.113.11)
### Zone Transfer Status
| Nameserver | AXFR Result | Records Obtained |
|------------|-------------|------------------|
| ns1.example.com | REFUSED | 0 |
| ns2.example.com | SUCCESS | 347 records |
### Subdomain Discovery Summary
| Method | Subdomains Found |
|--------|-----------------|
| Zone Transfer | 347 |
| Passive (subfinder + amass) | 89 |
| Active Brute Force | 12 |
| **Total Unique** | **412** |
### Critical Findings
1. **Zone Transfer Allowed** (High): ns2.example.com allows AXFR from any source
2. **Internal IP Disclosure** (Medium): 15 subdomains resolve to RFC1918 addresses
3. **Exposed Staging Environment** (High): staging.example.com accessible with default credentials
4. **Missing DMARC Policy** (Medium): No DMARC record found, enabling email spoofing
5. **Weak SPF Record** (Low): SPF uses ~all (soft fail) instead of -all (hard fail)