⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY
This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate
Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
User.update(req.body) // body has {"role": "admin"} → privilege escalation
header = {"alg": "none", "typ": "JWT"}
payload = {"sub": 1, "role": "admin"}
# Pseudocode only: JSON-serialize and base64url-encode without padding.
# A token with alg=none is a candidate; correct verifiers reject it.
# Get server's public key from /.well-known/jwks.json
# Sign token with public key as HMAC secret
token = jwt.encode({"sub": "admin", "role": "admin"}, pub_key, algorithm="HS256")
# Only a misconfigured verifier with compatible key handling could accept it;
# modern libraries commonly reject asymmetric keys as HMAC secrets.
// Server-side — Node.js merge without protection
{"__proto__": {"admin": true}}
{"constructor": {"prototype": {"admin": true}}}
// URL: ?__proto__[isAdmin]=true&__proto__[role]=superadmin
For server-side prototype pollution, hunt for an object merge primitive first, then a sink. Favor
JSON/object update endpoints such as profile, address, preferences, settings, cart, admin job, import,
or webhook configuration. Do not stop at a 200 response to __proto__; prove that polluted prototype
state reaches a later operation.
Hunt sequence:
Try both JSON and form encodings when the app accepts forms. Include CSRF/session fields when needed.
{"__proto__":{"polluted":"pp-1337"}}
{"constructor":{"prototype":{"polluted":"pp-1337"}}}
__proto__[polluted]=pp-1337
constructor[prototype][polluted]=pp-1337
endpoints and compare with baseline. Strong signals include changed JSON defaults, unexpected fields,
server errors mentioning object properties, changed job output, template/render errors, or command/job
behavior changes.
Use only the inert polluted marker in a disposable test process; command/job,
role-changing or inspector properties are escalation hypotheses, not default probes.
Use this when a frontend form or endpoint appears to call a server-side API on your behalf
(password reset, account lookup, profile fetch, product lookup, stock check, search). The bug is not
ordinary client-side query pollution. The server takes your input and interpolates it into a backend
URL path or query string, such as:
/api/internal/users/<username>/field/email
/api/users/<id>
/api/users?username=<username>&field=email
Hunt sequence:
for form actions, fetch(...), hidden CSRF fields, and the exact parameter name the browser sends.
If there is a reset/account form, test known usernames first to learn the normal success/error shape.
#, ?, &x=y, /, ../, and encoded forms %23, %3f, %26x=y, %2f, %2e%2e%2f.
Distinct errors such as Invalid route, API definition, unsupported field, or changed returned
fields are routing hypotheses, not proof of server-side interpolation; compare controlled fixtures and inspect server behavior.
username/../other-user changes thereferenced account, the input is in a REST path segment. Then try appending route fragments such as/field/email, /field/id, /field/username, /field/syntheticCanary, and terminate the rest
of the original backend path with # or %23 when the backend URL parser honors fragments.
common documentation/spec paths: /openapi.json, /swagger.json, /api-docs, /api/swagger.json,/swagger/v1/swagger.json, /v3/api-docs, and path-traversal variants that attempt to reach the
spec from the vulnerable backend route. A spec or descriptive route error tells you valid resources
and field names.
Payload patterns to try, adapted to the observed parameter name:
username=administrator%23
username=administrator%3f
username=administrator%2f..%2fvictimuser
username=administrator/../victimuser
username=administrator/field/email%23
username=administrator/field/id%23
username=administrator/field/syntheticCanary%23
username=administrator%2ffield%2fpasswordResetToken%23
# Test: reflected origin + credentials
curl -s -I -H "Origin: https://controlled-origin.example" https://target.example/api/user/me
# If: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://controlled-origin.example + Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
# → Candidate only: browser credentials, SameSite, preflight and readable sensitive body must be demonstrated with controlled identities
OData query options can expose information or consume resources only when the actual
service’s authorization, parser or query-cost controls are inadequate. Do not assume
operator casing/encoding equivalence, a WAF bypass, SQL injection, XXE or a current
CVE from the presence of OData. Dialect/version/provider behavior differs.
Use a tiny owner-approved sandbox with synthetic data:
canary field, documentedexpected permissions and a reset path. Inspect the service schema as inert data.
$select, $filter, $orderby and $expand against expected field ANDrelated-object authorization. Do not use real password hashes, cards or PII.
canary, ordering/filtering by it must not revealits value through a repeatable oracle. Document the controlled difference and
rule, not merely a response count.
and preserve auth per subrequest. A parsing difference alone is not exploitation.
No destructive SQL, blind extraction loop or unlimited expansion is needed for a
minimal report. Review the provider’s current security advisories and original
research before claiming any historical version range, patch date or public case.
Public documentation may be intentional; it is not itself an authentication bypass,
complete inventory or proof that every described operation is deployed. Fetch only
approved bounded spec URLs, validate schema and treat operation descriptions,
external $ref targets, servers and example URLs as untrusted data. Never automatically
feed every path to a scanner, execute “Try it out”, or follow third-party references.
A useful static check is jq '.paths | keys' approved-spec.json on a private local
copy. Then compare a single owned synthetic object across authorized/unauthorized
identities. Privileged writable DTO fields are candidates requiring persisted-state
verification, not proof from a schema name or 200 status. Remote Swagger UI config
loading/version banners require current bundle configuration and advisory checks;
do not send crafted links to unsuspecting users. No public case, payout, CVE range
or target behavior has been verified by these examples.
hunt-ato — Mass assignment on signup/profile is the fastest path to admin. Chain primitive: API mass assignment + hunt-ato → role=admin set on signup → ATO via privileged role on first login.hunt-auth-bypass — JWT flaws collapse the entire auth layer. Chain primitive: JWT alg=none + hunt-auth-bypass → impersonate any user by setting sub to victim ID, no signature required.hunt-rce — Prototype pollution gadgets in Node.js dependencies (lodash, mongoose, jQuery) reach child_process.spawn. Chain primitive: Prototype pollution (__proto__.shell=true) + hunt-rce (Node.js gadget chain) → RCE on the API node.hunt-subdomain — CORS regex with wildcard subdomain trusts a takeoverable host. Chain primitive: CORS allowlist *.target.com + subdomain takeover → attacker-controlled origin reads credentialed API responses.security-arsenal — Load the JWT Attack Payloads section (alg=none, kid path traversal, JWK injection, embedded JWK) and the Mass-Assignment Field Wordlist (is_admin, role, verified, permissions, org_id, tenant_id).triage-validation — Apply the Server-Policy-vs-State gate: a permissive CORS header alone is informational; demonstrate actual cross-origin credentialed read of sensitive data before reporting.triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement brief
Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.