⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
- Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
- Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
- Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
- Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Clickjacking (UI Redressing) lets an attacker load a target page inside a transparent iframe on a malicious site. The victim sees the attacker's decoy UI but clicks the hidden target UI beneath it. No JavaScript on the target is required.
Highest-value targets:
Two mechanisms prevent framing:
X-Frame-Options: DENY # strongest — blocks all framing
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN # allows same-origin frames only
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none' # CSP equivalent of DENY
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' # CSP equivalent of SAMEORIGIN
If NEITHER is present, the page is frameable from any origin.
Header-absence is the trigger for investigation, not the finding. Two steps:
Step 1 — Header check (screening). Fetch the target page and inspect the response headers:
curl -sI https://target.example/account/transfer | grep -iE 'x-frame-options|content-security-policy'
If BOTH X-Frame-Options and CSP frame-ancestors are absent, the page is a candidate. If either is present and restrictive (DENY/SAMEORIGIN/frame-ancestors 'none'|'self'), stop — it's protected.
Step 2 — Prove it actually frames and clicks (required for a real finding). Build a minimal PoC and load it in a real browser:
<!doctype html>
<h1>Win a prize — click below</h1>
<iframe src="https://target.example/account/transfer"
style="opacity:0.1;position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:1000px;height:800px"></iframe>
Confirm ALL of the following, or it is not exploitable:
if(top!==self) breakout, or a Sec-Fetch-Dest/JS frame check).SameSite=Lax or SameSite=Strict (the modern default), the cookie is not sent on the cross-site framed request, and the clickjack fails. Verify the victim's authenticated state carries into the frame.Strategy: target the most sensitive action pages first — severity scales directly with what the victim is tricked into doing.
A valid clickjacking report shows: (1) the target page rendered inside an attacker-controlled iframe in a real browser, (2) a sensitive state-changing action reachable by a framed click while the victim is authenticated (cookies survive the cross-site context), and (3) a screenshot/recording of the overlay. Reporting missing headers with no working frame PoC is a documentation-quality issue, not a vulnerability.
triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement brief
Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.