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This technique abuses the Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR) to impersonate a Domain Controller (DC). By exploiting replication rights (e.g., DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All), attackers can dump password hashes for critical accounts, such as KRBTGT and Domain Admins. The extracted hashes are used to forge Golden Tickets, achieving long-term, persistent domain access. This is a critical post-exploitation method used during authorized red team engagements.

Provides analysts with a workflow to hunt and investigate credential dumping (LSASS, SAM, NTDS, DCSync) using EDR telemetry, Sysmon access events, and AD replication monitoring.

This guide details comprehensive detection methods for DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) in Active Directory. Attackers abuse legitimate directory replication protocols to extract sensitive password hashes. Detection relies on auditing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized access attempts to critical Directory Service GUIDs, specifically flagging non-domain-controller accounts attempting replication calls. Essential for threat hunting and incident response.

This guide details the exploitation chain for noPac, combining CVE-2021-42278 (sAMAccountName spoofing) and CVE-2021-42287 (KDC PAC confusion). It demonstrates how an attacker can escalate from a standard domain user to Domain Admin by manipulating Active Directory tickets and performing DCSync. Primarily used in authorized red-teaming and penetration testing to validate domain security.

This guide details the exploitation of the critical Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) in Active Directory Domain Controllers. It demonstrates the methodology for resetting the DC machine account password to empty, achieving full domain compromise. Subsequent steps include dumping domain credentials using DCSync. Essential for authorized red-teaming and security validation.

This guide details how to hunt for DCSync attacks (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006) in Active Directory environments. It focuses on analyzing Windows Security Event ID 4662, specifically looking for DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests originating from non-domain-controller accounts. This technique is critical for incident response, purple teaming, and detecting unauthorized credential theft via Active Directory replication abuse.

A comprehensive playbook detailing advanced techniques for exploiting misconfigured Active Directory Access Control Lists (ACLs). It covers BloodHound enumeration, abusing dangerous ACE types (GenericAll, WriteDACL), conducting DCSync attacks, leveraging shadow credentials, and exploiting GPO/LAPS weaknesses for privilege escalation and lateral movement in a deep dive for security professionals.

This technique exploits vulnerable Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) HTTP web-enrollment endpoints (ESC8) that lack Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA). By coercing a Domain Controller (DC) to authenticate and relaying the captured NTLM credentials, an attacker can obtain a DC machine certificate. This certificate is then used via PKINIT to request a TGT, recover the DC's NT hash, and ultimately achieve full domain compromise via DCSync. Essential for advanced AD red-teaming simulations.