Skill UI

This skill guides security analysts through advanced threat-hunting methodologies focused on detecting DNS-based persistence. It analyzes passive DNS history, zone file audits, and API data (like SecurityTrails) to identify unauthorized record modifications, subdomain takeovers, and DNS hijacking attempts that bypass traditional security controls. Ideal for SOC analysts and threat hunters.

A comprehensive guide and detection methodology for identifying covert communication channels utilizing DNS records. This technique analyzes Zeek dns.log for indicators such as high-entropy subdomains, excessive query volume, unusually long query lengths, and abnormal record type distributions, which suggest data exfiltration or Command and Control (C2) activity.

This skill detects domain fronting, an advanced technique used by attackers to mask Command and Control (C2) traffic. It analyzes proxy/web gateway logs for mismatches between the TLS SNI field and the HTTP Host header, combined with deep TLS certificate inspection using pyOpenSSL. This is crucial for security teams investigating sophisticated network threats and validating detection coverage.

This skill detects WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing key Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs. It focuses on identifying suspicious process execution patterns, such as WmiPrvSE.exe spawning unauthorized child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe), suspicious command lines, and WMI event subscriptions used for persistence. Ideal for security incident response and threat detection.

A comprehensive guide and methodology for proactively hunting adversary abuse of legitimate cloud services (Azure, AWS, GCP, SaaS). This technique focuses on identifying Command and Control (C2), data staging, and exfiltration methods that leverage normal cloud functionality, making detection challenging.

Provides a structured methodology for proactive threat hunting against Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins). It guides practitioners in identifying techniques where adversaries abuse legitimate system tools (like certutil, mshta, rundll32) to execute payloads while bypassing traditional security controls (AV/EDR). Ideal for incident response, red team validation, and improving detection coverage against fileless attacks.

This skill provides advanced threat hunting capabilities to detect NTLM relay attacks within Active Directory environments. It analyzes critical Windows Security Event 4624 logs, specifically focusing on logon type 3 using NTLMSSP authentication. The detection logic identifies suspicious patterns, including IP-to-hostname mismatches, rapid multi-host authentications, and lack of SMB signing enforcement, helping SOC analysts pinpoint unauthorized credential access attempts.

This guide details a systematic methodology for proactive threat hunting across Windows endpoints. It focuses on identifying various adversary persistence techniques, such as registry modifications (Run Keys), malicious services, WMI event subscriptions, and scheduled tasks. It is essential for incident response, security audits, and improving detection coverage against dormant backdoors.

This skill provides a structured methodology for detecting process injection techniques (MITRE ATT&CK T1055), which adversaries use for defense evasion and privilege escalation. It analyzes granular security logs, specifically utilizing Sysmon Event IDs 8 (CreateRemoteThread) and 10 (ProcessAccess), alongside source-target process relationship mapping to identify suspicious malicious behavior over general system activity.

A detailed methodology for proactive threat hunting focused on identifying deep-seated persistence mechanisms within Windows operating systems. This guide covers advanced techniques such as monitoring Run keys, analyzing Winlogon modifications, detecting IFEO injection, and identifying COM object hijacking. It is crucial for incident response, purple teaming, and ensuring system integrity against advanced persistent threats (APTs).

This guide details a threat hunting technique for detecting persistence mechanisms utilizing Windows Registry Run keys (T1547.001). By analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs, it identifies suspicious auto-start entries pointing to temporary directories, encoded PowerShell commands, or abused LOLBins. Essential for SOC analysts and security engineers investigating incidents and developing robust detection rules.

This methodology guides security professionals in proactively hunting for suspicious activity related to Volume Shadow Copy deletion. By monitoring commands like vssadmin, wmic, and PowerShell usage, it helps detect anti-forensics techniques and preparatory steps often executed by ransomware actors, crucial during incident response or threat hunting exercises.