Use this skill when:
Do not use for log source onboarding or parsing — that requires QRadar administrator access and DSM editor knowledge.
Open an offense in QRadar and query contributing events using AQL (Ariel Query Language):
SELECT DATEFORMAT(startTime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
sourceIP, destinationIP, username,
LOGSOURCENAME(logSourceId) AS log_source,
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
category, magnitude
FROM events
WHERE INOFFENSE(12345)
ORDER BY startTime ASC
LIMIT 500
Pivot on the source IP to find all activity:
SELECT DATEFORMAT(startTime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
destinationIP, destinationPort, username,
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
eventCount, category
FROM events
WHERE sourceIP = '192.168.1.105'
AND startTime > NOW() - 24*60*60*1000
ORDER BY startTime ASC
LIMIT 1000
Create a multi-condition rule detecting brute force followed by successful login:
Rule 1 — Brute Force Detection (Building Block):
Rule Type: Event
Rule Name: BB: Multiple Failed Logins from Same Source
Tests:
- When the event(s) were detected by one or more of [Local]
- AND when the event QID is one of [Authentication Failure (5000001)]
- AND when at least 10 events are seen with the same Source IP
in 5 minutes
Rule Action: Dispatch new event (Category: Authentication, QID: Custom_BruteForce)
Rule 2 — Brute Force Succeeded (Correlation Rule):
Rule Type: Offense
Rule Name: COR: Brute Force with Subsequent Successful Login
Tests:
- When an event matches the building block BB: Multiple Failed Logins from Same Source
- AND when an event with QID [Authentication Success (5000000)] is detected
from the same Source IP within 10 minutes
- AND the Destination IP is the same for both events
Rule Action: Create offense, set severity to High, set relevance to 8
Correlate authentication failures with network flows to detect lateral movement:
SELECT e.sourceIP, e.destinationIP, e.username,
QIDNAME(e.qid) AS event_name,
e.eventCount,
f.sourceBytes, f.destinationBytes
FROM events e
LEFT JOIN flows f ON e.sourceIP = f.sourceIP
AND e.destinationIP = f.destinationIP
AND f.startTime BETWEEN e.startTime AND e.startTime + 300000
WHERE e.category = 'Authentication'
AND e.sourceIP IN (
SELECT sourceIP FROM events
WHERE QIDNAME(qid) = 'Authentication Failure'
AND startTime > NOW() - 3600000
GROUP BY sourceIP
HAVING COUNT(*) > 20
)
AND e.startTime > NOW() - 3600000
ORDER BY e.startTime ASC
Detect data exfiltration by correlating DNS queries with large outbound flows:
SELECT sourceIP, destinationIP,
SUM(sourceBytes) AS total_bytes_out,
COUNT(*) AS flow_count
FROM flows
WHERE sourceIP IN (
SELECT sourceIP FROM events
WHERE QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%DNS%'
AND destinationIP NOT IN (
SELECT ip FROM reference_data.sets('Internal_DNS_Servers')
)
AND startTime > NOW() - 86400000
GROUP BY sourceIP
HAVING COUNT(*) > 500
)
AND destinationPort NOT IN (80, 443, 53)
AND startTime > NOW() - 86400000
GROUP BY sourceIP, destinationIP
HAVING SUM(sourceBytes) > 104857600
ORDER BY total_bytes_out DESC
Create reference sets for dynamic whitelists and watchlists:
# Create reference set via QRadar API
curl -X POST "https://qradar.example.com/api/reference_data/sets" \
-H "SEC: YOUR_API_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "Known_Pen_Test_IPs",
"element_type": "IP",
"timeout_type": "LAST_SEEN",
"time_to_live": "30 days"
}'
# Add entries
curl -X POST "https://qradar.example.com/api/reference_data/sets/Known_Pen_Test_IPs" \
-H "SEC: YOUR_API_TOKEN" \
-d "value=10.0.5.100"
Use reference sets in rule conditions to exclude known benign activity:
Test: AND when the Source IP is NOT contained in any of [Known_Pen_Test_IPs]
Test: AND when the Destination IP is contained in any of [Critical_Asset_IPs]
Reduce false positives by adding building block filters:
-- Find top false positive generators
SELECT QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
LOGSOURCENAME(logSourceId) AS log_source,
COUNT(*) AS event_count,
COUNT(DISTINCT sourceIP) AS unique_sources
FROM events
WHERE INOFFENSE(
SELECT offenseId FROM offenses
WHERE status = 'CLOSED'
AND closeReason = 'False Positive'
AND startTime > NOW() - 30*24*60*60*1000
)
GROUP BY qid, logSourceId
ORDER BY event_count DESC
LIMIT 20
Apply tuning:
Create a QRadar Pulse dashboard with key correlation metrics:
-- Active offenses by category
SELECT offenseType, status, COUNT(*) AS offense_count,
AVG(magnitude) AS avg_magnitude
FROM offenses
WHERE status = 'OPEN'
GROUP BY offenseType, status
ORDER BY offense_count DESC
-- Mean time to close offenses
SELECT DATEFORMAT(startTime, 'yyyy-MM-dd') AS day,
AVG(closeTime - startTime) / 60000 AS avg_close_minutes,
COUNT(*) AS closed_count
FROM offenses
WHERE status = 'CLOSED'
AND startTime > NOW() - 30*24*60*60*1000
GROUP BY DATEFORMAT(startTime, 'yyyy-MM-dd')
ORDER BY day
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| AQL | Ariel Query Language — QRadar's SQL-like query language for searching events, flows, and offenses |
| Offense | QRadar's correlated incident grouping multiple events/flows under a single investigation unit |
| Building Block | Reusable rule component that categorizes events without generating offenses, used as input to correlation rules |
| Magnitude | QRadar's calculated offense severity combining relevance, severity, and credibility scores (1-10) |
| Reference Set | Dynamic lookup table in QRadar for whitelists, watchlists, and enrichment data used in rules |
| QID | QRadar Identifier — unique numeric ID mapping vendor-specific events to normalized categories |
| Coalescing | QRadar's mechanism for grouping related events into a single offense to reduce analyst workload |
QRADAR OFFENSE INVESTIGATION — Offense #12345
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Offense Type: Brute Force with Subsequent Access
Magnitude: 8/10 (Severity: 8, Relevance: 9, Credibility: 7)
Created: 2024-03-15 14:23:07 UTC
Contributing: 247 events from 3 log sources
Correlation Chain:
14:10-14:22 — 234 Authentication Failures (EventCode 4625) from 192.168.1.105 to DC-01
14:23:07 — Authentication Success (EventCode 4624) from 192.168.1.105 to DC-01 (user: admin)
14:25:33 — New Process: cmd.exe spawned by admin on DC-01
14:26:01 — Net.exe user /add detected on DC-01
Sources Correlated:
Windows Security Logs (DC-01)
Sysmon (DC-01)
Firewall (Palo Alto PA-5260)
Disposition: TRUE POSITIVE — Escalated to Incident Response
Ticket: IR-2024-0432