Skill UI

This skill guides threat hunters in detecting Cobalt Strike Command and Control (C2) beacons. It utilizes advanced network forensic techniques, including analyzing default TLS certificate serials, JA3/JA3S/JARM fingerprints, beacon jitter, and HTTP profile matching. Detection is achieved by correlating data from Zeek logs, Suricata rules, and Python PCAP analysis to identify suspicious outbound communications.

This capability provides advanced threat hunting by analyzing network telemetry (DNS, proxy, connection logs) to detect Command and Control (C2) beaconing patterns. It uses statistical analysis, frequency detection, and jitter analysis to identify compromised endpoints communicating with adversary infrastructure, crucial for proactive threat detection and incident response.

This skill guides security analysts in detecting data staging activities, a critical precursor to data exfiltration. It monitors for the use of archiving tools (7-Zip, RAR), unusual file consolidation patterns, and suspicious writes to temporary or hidden directories using EDR and process telemetry. Essential for proactive threat hunting and improving detection coverage for T1074 techniques.

This guide details how to hunt for DCSync attacks, a technique used to steal password hashes from Active Directory. It involves analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 to identify unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests originating from non-domain-controller accounts. Essential for incident response and threat detection.

This skill detects domain fronting, an advanced technique used by attackers to mask Command and Control (C2) traffic. It analyzes proxy/web gateway logs for mismatches between the TLS SNI field and the HTTP Host header, combined with deep TLS certificate inspection using pyOpenSSL. This is crucial for security teams investigating sophisticated network threats and validating detection coverage.

This skill detects WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing key Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs. It focuses on identifying suspicious process execution patterns, such as WmiPrvSE.exe spawning unauthorized child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe), suspicious command lines, and WMI event subscriptions used for persistence. Ideal for security incident response and threat detection.

Provides a structured methodology for proactive threat hunting against Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins). It guides practitioners in identifying techniques where adversaries abuse legitimate system tools (like certutil, mshta, rundll32) to execute payloads while bypassing traditional security controls (AV/EDR). Ideal for incident response, red team validation, and improving detection coverage against fileless attacks.

This skill focuses on threat hunting techniques to detect adversaries leveraging Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBins). By analyzing detailed endpoint process creation logs (e.g., Sysmon), practitioners can identify suspicious execution patterns of legitimate Windows system binaries (like certutil, mshta, rundll32) used for malicious fileless attacks or defense evasion. It is crucial for improving detection coverage against advanced persistent threats.

This skill provides advanced threat hunting capabilities to detect NTLM relay attacks within Active Directory environments. It analyzes critical Windows Security Event 4624 logs, specifically focusing on logon type 3 using NTLMSSP authentication. The detection logic identifies suspicious patterns, including IP-to-hostname mismatches, rapid multi-host authentications, and lack of SMB signing enforcement, helping SOC analysts pinpoint unauthorized credential access attempts.

This guide details a systematic methodology for proactive threat hunting across Windows endpoints. It focuses on identifying various adversary persistence techniques, such as registry modifications (Run Keys), malicious services, WMI event subscriptions, and scheduled tasks. It is essential for incident response, security audits, and improving detection coverage against dormant backdoors.

This guide details a threat hunting technique for detecting persistence mechanisms utilizing Windows Registry Run keys (T1547.001). By analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs, it identifies suspicious auto-start entries pointing to temporary directories, encoded PowerShell commands, or abused LOLBins. Essential for SOC analysts and security engineers investigating incidents and developing robust detection rules.

This guide details a structured threat hunting methodology designed to proactively detect sophisticated spearphishing campaigns. It instructs users on correlating indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry (EDR), and network data (SIEM) to identify targeted threats, supporting incident response and security posture improvement.